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Abstract
Foundational ontologies, central constructs in ontological investigations and
engineering alike, are based on ontological categories. Firstly proposed by Aris-
totle as the very ur-elements from which the whole of reality can be derived, they
are not easy to identify, let alone partition and/or hierarchize; in particular, the
question of their number poses serious challenges. The late medieval philosopher
Dietrich of Freiberg wrote around 1286 a tutorial that can help us today with
this exceedingly difficult task. In this paper, I discuss ontological categories and
their importance for foundational ontologies from both the contemporary per-
spective and the original Aristotelian viewpoint, I provide the translation from
the Latin into English of Dietrich’s De origine II with an introductory elabo-
ration, and I extract a foundational ontology–that is in fact a single-category
one–from this text rooted in Dietrich’s specification of types of subjecthood and
his conception of intentionality as causal operation.
Key words: Ontological category; Foundational ontology; Aristotelian cat-
egories; Subjecthood; Intentionality & Causality; Dietrich of Freiberg
1 Introduction
A central topic in ontology is that of identifying the basic, or foundational, ontolog-
ical categories (henceforth often just categories), or the ur-elements from which the
whole of reality is believed to be composed: If one manages to carry out such an
exclusive and exhaustive ur-segregation–i.e. only, and all, the basic categories are
identified–then one has what is called a foundational ontology. Besides the intrin-
sic importance of such a construct, it also allows for interoperability among domain
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ontologies and application ontologies (see, e.g., Keet, 2011; Schneider, 2003; Schulz,
2018; Trojahn et al., 2021); these, as their coinage denotes, are very fine-grained onto-
logical distinctions, so fine-grained indeed that they comprise particulars (for instance,
an electrical-vehicle ontology can comprise particulars such as cars, bikes, rollers, etc.
that can be individuated up to their brand names).
Although “foundational ontology” can be seen as synonymous with “upper ontol-
ogy” or“top-level ontology” (e.g., Obrst, 2010), I shall consider a foundational ontology
to be an upper/top-level ontology that is category-based. The task of designing, or en-
gineering, a foundational ontology requires an adequate strategy both to identify the
basic ontological categories and to establish the relations among them (e.g., Schnei-
der, 2003; Westerhoff, 2005). In the effort to carry out this task, it is often the case
that ontologists see themselves as trying to invent the wheel, an unnecessary effort if
one takes into account the fact that since at least the Greek philosopher Parmenides
scores of philosophers have busied themselves with it. To be sure, the possible bridges
between what I ad-hocly distinguished as mainstream and formal ontology (Augusto,
2021) are far from obvious, or even desirable in some cases–for instance, when formal
ontology is considered in the context of information-driven science (Smith, 2021)–,
but they are likely to pay off in the end.
The philosopher who can be said to have set off the Western philosophical tradi-
tion of identifying the basic ontological categories is Aristotle: In his Categories (cf.
Aristotle, sd/1963), he proposed that the whole of reality can be derived from only
ten categories if we see nine of them as“happening to”(i.e. as accidents of), or even as
“being told of,” the most primordial of them, (the) substance. Despite their antiquity,
Aristotle’s categories remain relevant constructs in today’s ontological investigations
and ontology-engineering efforts (e.g., Arp et al., 2015; Mann, 2000; Tahko, 2012).
But there is not a single consensual view on them, which makes them largely unusable
by ontology-engineering projects. Dietrich of Freiberg, a late medieval philosopher,
approached them from a novel viewpoint, that of causality and intentionality, and
in doing so discussed them at length in what might today be seen as a tutorial. I
here give the translation from the Latin into English of his De origine II (abbrevi-
ating Tractatus de origine rerum praedicamentalium, Part II, available in Dietrich
von Freiberg, sd/1983), written at about 1286; before this translation I analyze the
relevance of categories in general, and the Aristotelian categories in particular, for
current ontology efforts, and after the translation I proceed to extract a foundational
ontology from it.
2 Ontological Categories and Foundational Ontolo-
gies
2.1 Ontological Categories as Shared Conceptualizations
A fundamental component of human cognition as an integrated system or architecture
is the shared conceptualization of the entities that compose reality and of the relations
among them (e.g., Philips & Wilson, 2010; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003). Like many
other components of cognition, this mental activity is largely, or mostly, unconscious
or implicit (Augusto, 2010; 2013; 2016; 2018). As cognitive agents, humans typically
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share implicit conceptual distinctions such as whole vs. part, animate vs. inanimate,
physical vs. abstract, duration vs. location, essential vs. accessory, universal vs. par-
ticular, etc. For instance, a flat is seen as a part of a building and this in turn as a part
of a city; animals and plants are conceived as animate organisms whereas rocks are
seen as inanimate material formations; a sphere is abstract, a geometrical object, but
a billiard ball is a physical object; a week vacation in a seaside resort comprises a du-
ration and a location; every living human has a head, a part of which–the scalp–may,
wholly or partly, or not at all, be covered with hair; Plato and Hypatia are two indi-
vidual humans. Deficits in these implicit shared distinctions generate communication
problems and cause thought processes in general to be disrupted (Augusto & Badie,
forthcoming; Badie & Augusto, forthcoming). These distinctions, in turn, require
coarser-grained shared concepts such as substance, property, state, process, quality,
quantity, etc., to make sense, even if their meaning is not conscious or explicit. For
example, anyone seeing a red rose is usually capable of, if asked to, separating the
flower itself from its color and seeing it mentally as, say, a white rose, or even a black
rose, though black roses do not occur as natural phenomena; and anyone is usually
capable of distinguishing a book from the process of reading it. These shared concep-
tualizations can be seen as the implicit formative action of two main factors that I
call the Volksgeist and the Zeitgeist to express respectively the collective action of a
largely linguistically and geographically localized community at a specific point in, or
period of, time. The interaction of these conceptualizations with language (signs) and
the objects in the real world (things), whose relation–reference–is basically removed
from the influence of these two collective forces for the reason that it is essentially
conventional and arbitrary (cf. Saussure, 1916), is what is often called the semiotic
triangle (Fig. 1).
Figure 1: The semiotic triangle. (Source: Augusto, 2021.)
When these implicitly shared conceptualizations become explicit we speak of on-
tology (doing) and the resulting distinctions are now often called ontological categories
(e.g., Cumpa & Tegtmeier, 2011; Galton & Mizoguchi, 2010; Westerhoff, 2005), even
if for brevity sake the simple term categories is more often than not to be found.
This explicitness is achieved by means of a sharing process that is to be distinguished
from the one schematized in the semiotic triangle in the sense that the Zeitgeist and
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Figure 2: The semiotic triangle adapted for ontology doing.
the Volksgeist are strategically replaced by a specific context (e.g., medical science in
the 21st century, or, more circumscribed, phenotypic abnormalities found in human
disease) and a group of experts in that context (e.g., experts in human phenotypes).
Importantly, in this adapted semiotic triangle the concepts give place to the (onto-
logical) categories (Fig. 2). The context and the group’s action can be extended so
as to capture (partly) the reference relation, because often new signs are strategically
created to designate (newly discovered or created) things in the world. However, this
is not essentially the case in ontology doing, which is focused on the categories as
a very specific type of concepts, namely the concepts from which the whole of the
referred-to things can be derived.1
Given the importance mentioned above of categories for human shared cognition,
their formalization is today central in many areas, from the natural sciences to the
humanities and the arts. In effect, there are already formalizations of, or there are
projects for formalizing, shared conceptualizations for such diverse domains as hu-
man psychology (e.g., Hay et al., 2017), human precision medicine (e.g., He et al.,
2014; Köhler et al., 2021; see Haendel et al., 2018, for further examples), geography
(e.g., Smith & Mark, 1998; 2001), agriculture (e.g., Arnaud et al., 2020), the per-
forming arts (e.g., Estermann & Schneeberger, 2017), etc. By “formalization” it is
meant here that the shared categories are expressed in a formal language, typically
a first-order predicate language, so as to allow for automated deduction in compu-
tational applications; then, “ontologies” just are the formal structures that provide
these computational capabilities (e.g., Borst, 1997; Studer et al., 1998). These formal
structures can be so specialized as to try to capture such restricted domains as, say,
urban information systems (Fonseca et al., 2000).
2.2 Ontological Categories and Foundational Ontologies
It is largely agreed that the ontological categories, taken in the sense of the most basic
categories from which the whole of reality can be derived (e.g., Chisholm, 1992), (i)
1But see in Augusto (2021) the case of the quintessence(s), an ontological category that tries
to capture an exceedingly vague but apparently useful ontological conceptualization in the natural
sciences, namely in physics.
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should be understood as the most general kinds of things and (ii) are organized in a
non-overlapping finite hierarchy. This establishes generality and well-foundedness as
two of the main requirements of a categorial ontological account that aims at being
a foundational ontology (see, e.g., Tegtmeier, 2011; Westerhoff, 2005). In the current
context of upper-ontology engineering, we are often confronted with projects that are
seen as foundational ontologies when in fact they do not satisfy these conditions. For
instance:
• GFO (General Formal Ontology) is claimed to be a foundational ontology, but
(cf. Herre, 2010): Its multi-categorial approach envisages universals, concepts,
and symbol structures and their interrelations, of which only universals, and
perhaps concepts, can be said to be basic categories; it includes objects (3D
entities) and processes (4D entities) and levels of reality, which might satisfy
both conditions (i) and (ii), but is designed for applications, which throws doubt
on this supposed satisfaction. All in all, in the summary presentation of this
project (Herre, 2010, p. 298) nowhere are to be found ur-elements such as
substances, properties, qualities, etc., or ur-distinctions such as part vs. whole,
essential vs. accessory, etc. (see Introduction).
• More flagrantly, UFO-B is presented as a foundational ontology for events (Guiz-
zardi et al., 2013), which appears to obliterate tout court condition (i).
• BORO (Business Objects Reference Ontology) is claimed to have a foundational
ontology, namely based on ontological realism (e.g., de Cesare & Partridge,
2016), which envisages an ontological category, object, that branches into three
top-level categories: elements, types, and tuples. In BORO, elements are ob-
jects whose identity is given by their spatiotemporal extension, but spacetime is
missing as a category in the top-level; thus, types, which are collections of any
of the three kinds of objects, and tuples, relationships between objects, also fail
to be ontologically well-founded.
These examples show how difficult it is to get the right conception of foundational on-
tology, as based on ontological categories, in the field of ontology engineering. But the
concept of ontological categories poses problems also in the context of current philo-
sophical investigations. Here, they can be wholly or partly rejected: For instance,
Bueno et al. (2015) argue that there are no categories of being whatsoever, propos-
ing instead concepts in the attempt to provide a non-deflationary understanding of
any–perhaps not basic–categorization. Paul (2017), in the quest for elegance and
sparseness, conceives one basic ontological category–qualities, or intrinsic characters,
synonymous with properties–as sufficient to support the ontological structure of the
world; composition (of qualities) is then the only relation, an ontological view that
he calls “mereological bundle theory” (see also Paul, 2012). Lowe (2005) recognizes
two fundamental categorial distinctions (universal vs. particular and substantial vs.
non-substantial) that, when combined, generate four fundamental ontological cate-
gories: objects (substantial particulars), modes (non-substantial particulars), kinds
(substantial universals), and attributes (non-substantial universals).
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2.3 The Aristotelian Categories
As seen above, it is not easy to identify the ontological categories that work as the
ur-elements of a foundational ontology. Aristotle, to whom we owe the coinage of
these ur-elements as categories, cannot be said to have gotten it right, either; not
completely, at least. The status and worth of these constructs have since their first
diffusion been highly controversial, as Kant put it summarily in his own elaboration
on the categories:
Aristotle’s search for these fundamental concepts was an effort worthy of
an acute man. But since he had no principle, he rounded them up as he
stumbled on them, and first got up a list of ten of them, which he called
categories (predicaments). Subsequently he believed that he had found
five more of them, which he added under the name of post-predicaments.
But his table still had holes. (Critique of Pure Reason, A 81/ B 107; Kant,
1781/1998)
There is indeed a plethora of open problems posed by Aristotle’s original text on the
categories, starting by their disputed authorship, which have to do with many and
diverse problematics. Some of these open questions are, for instance:
• Are these linguistic or ontological categories (e.g., Boys-Stones, 2017, Ch. 15;
Stough, 1972)? In the original Greek text (Aristotle, sd/1831), Aristotle intro-
duces the ten categories via an ubiquitous use of the verbs legesthai, to be said,
to be spoken of, and katêgoresthai, to be predicated (of something).
• How many categories are there really? For instance, Aristotle’s can be seen as a
two-category ontology, a ur-distinction between substances and accidents (Paul,
2017). But concerning the latter, Aristotle’s treatment at length of quantity,
quality, and relation contrasts with the all too summary one given to the re-
maining six accidents, which are not the object of any finer granulation (see Fig.
4 below).
• Is Aristotle’s really a foundational ontology, i.e. is his list of categories exhaus-
tive in the sense that one can derive the whole of reality from them, and are they
really basic? For instance, given the issue immediately above, one may argue
that Aristotle’s only truly basic categories are substance, quantity, quality, and
relation.
Despite these and (many) other problems, Aristotle’s categories were central in many
periods of Western philosophy, in particular in the long period of what is called me-
dieval philosophy (e.g., Thom, 2011), during which they were known as the praedica-
menta in an obvious allusion to praedicari (to be predicated or said of, in English), and
they might in fact become center-stage again in contemporary ontological investiga-
tions (e.g., Tahko, 2012). I briefly discuss here the ten categories, the praedicamenta
proper, and even more briefly the pre-predicaments, leaving the post-predicaments
entirely out of this summary discussion.2
2See, e.g., Studtmann (2012) for a more comprehensive discussion of Aristotle’s categories.
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In Aristotle’s Categories (1b25), we can read:3
Of the things that are spoken of without any combination, each one sig-
nifies a substance, a quantity, a quality, a relation, a place, a time, a
position, a state, an action, or a passion.
By “things that are spoken of without any combination” Aristotle means isolated
nouns (e.g., “man”) and verbs (e.g., “runs”), by opposition to which we have the
grammatical structure noun + verb (e.g., “man runs”). If we consider the former,
that I shall abbreviate ad-hocly as “α things,” then we have what appears to be
an exclusive disjunction corresponding to a ur-partition of the things that compose
reality. (See Figure 3.)
Importantly, before this ur-segregation Aristotle had summarily elaborated on the
difference between being said of a subject and being in a subject, proposing a fourfold
ur-distinction of entities–known as the ontological square–into those that (a) are said
of a subject but are not in any subject, (b) are in a subject but are not said of any
subject, (c) are both in a subject and said of a subject, and (d) are neither in a
subject nor said of a subject (Categories, 1a20). For instance, “man” is an a-entity,
as it is said of a subject (the individual man) but is not in any subject, whereas the
individual white is in, but not said of, a subject (a b-entity); “knowledge” is a c-entity,
being both in a subject (the soul) and said of a subject (e.g., knowledge of grammar);
the individual man is a d -entity, neither in nor said of any subject. Aristotle briefly
explains that by “in a subject” he means not parthood but ontological dependency,
i.e. what is in a subject “cannot exist separately from what it is in” (ibid.).
The question arises: What is in a subject–in the sense of being intrinsic to it–that
makes it so that other entities are in it and cannot exist separately from it? This,
which I shall call subjecthood, is a metaphysical question that is not answered in the
Categories; in this text, all we are told is that substance is that which is neither said
of a subject nor in a subject (cf. Categories, 2a11); so, substance is a d -entity. It can
actually be also distinguished into first and second substances, as shown in Figure 4.
To retain from this distinction is that the second substances are a-entities.4 Aris-
totle then goes on to distinguish this from the case of the things that are in a subject,
but in which in most cases neither the name nor the definition is predicated of the sub-
ject; for example“white,” whose definition cannot be predicated of a body (Categories,
2a19). Finally, Aristotle tells us that “all other things are either said of the primary
substances as subjects or in them as subjects” (ibid., 2a34), so this gives us a notion of
subjecthood in the Categories, albeit an all too vague one.5 These “all other things,”
or c-entities, are what ended up being called accidents in the sense that they “happen
to” the substance. Briefly, what we end up with at the end of Chapter 9 of Categories,
and by “updating” this with the distinction made by Aristotle between substance and
3All translations of passages of the Categories from the Greek (Aristotle, sd/1831) into English
are mine. Just as in my translation of the De origine, my objective is a compromise between classical
and philosophical scholarship and contemporary work in ontology, which includes current ontology
engineering for computational ends. See Ackrill’s for a standard translation in Aristotle (sd/1963).
It must be remarked that the Categories is not an exclusive Aristotelian source for the categories,
with his Topics also being relevant. This said, I shall focus solely on the Categories. Additionally,
the medieval philosophers used Latin translations of the original Greek text, and I use the Latin
terms whenever this practice is relevant.
4Omitting many details, such as Aristotle’s discussion of the genera, species, and differentiae.
5See Shatalov (2020) for a discussion of subjecthood and substancehood in Aristotle.
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Figure 3: Initial ur-partition of the Aristotelian categories.
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Figure 4: Aristotle’s two substances.
accident in his Metaphysics VII, 1, 1028a10-31–the latter does not subsist by itself
and hence cannot be separated from the substance; it happens (symbáınei, in Greek;
accidet, in Latin)6 to the substance–is the ontological ur-partition in Figure 5 that
can be seen as his foundational ontology.7
If one compares Figure 5–which one may call an ontological diagram to distinguish
this from the usual graph-based representations–with upper ontologies such as BFO,
DOLCE, SUMO, OCHRE, etc., after restructuring them in this format,8 one will
certainly notice the explicit or implicit presence of (fragments of) Aristotle’s founda-
tional ontology. However, this is more often than not–there are exceptions (e.g., Arp
et al., 2015)–not acknowledged in the standard literature on these ontologies, in which
such crucial aspects as their respective ontological commitments are often discussed
at length.
6Reason why the Greek term for the Latin accidens is symbebekós.
7Note the distinction between time and place taken as quantities (khrónos and tópos, respectively,
in Greek) and taken as accidents, in which case they are referred to as at a certain moment, or
just as when (poté, in Greek) and in a certain place, or just where (poú). As for the qualities,
Aristotle concedes that his list might not be complete. Additionally, while some qualities admit
of relations such as more or less (for instance, a man might be called healthier–a condition–than
another), qualities and relations are indeed partition classes if taken in the strictest sense of distinct
categories. Beginning in Categories, 11a20, Aristotle elaborates on this sub-partition, but concedes
that these two classes may overlap. This goes against condition (ii) above, so that Aristotle’s might
not be considered a foundational ontology in today’s perspective. In Figure 5, I reduce Aristotle’s
relations to relatives and correlatives; Table 1 in Section 4.2.4 below provides a more comprehensive
identification of these entities, namely as seen by Dietrich of Freiberg.
8I do this for some of these upper ontologies in Augusto (2021), which also provides the relevant
literature.
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3 A Tutorial on Ontological Categories
3.1 Ontological Categories and Their Causes: A First Ur-
Partition
In part I of his Treatise on the origin of the categories (Tractatus de origine rerum
praedicamentalium), abbreviated as De origine and possibly written around 1286,
a date proposed in Flasch (2007), the late medieval German philosopher Dietrich
of Freiberg carried out a ur-segregation of entities that constitutes the top level of a
causality-based upper ontology that is in fact a foundational ontology, i.e. it considers
mostly the Aristotelian categories but it also introduces a new category, which is said
to have the manner of accidents, to wit, the properties. This consideration falls on
entities with respect to their causal origin, that which makes it so that an entity
depends directly on its cause to begin being as such. It is important here to paste
his definition of entity : “that which is in itself, and which is complete in terms of
the act that belongs to it according to its own genus; ... also ... that which has the
nature and the character of an entity in its essence” (De origine I, 1; Augusto, 2021).9
This ur-category, entity or being (ens, in Latin), is ur-partitioned into substance and
accident, the former defined as that which is a complete entity per se both formally
and in terms of its final cause, “not because it is something of some thing, or from
some thing, in terms of the form” (ibid., 23), and the latter contrasted with this as
that which is in, or belongs to, a substance (cf. ibid., 25). This is by and large
Aristotle’s own ur-segregation of entities (cf. Section 2.3 above). However, Dietrich
sees the entities other than the substance as substances, too, by analogy (ibid., 25).
In order to further partition this ur-segregation Dietrich conceives a tripartition
of causes into those that are intrinsic to an entity, those that are extrinsic to it,
and those that are both intrinsic and extrinsic to it. The first, corresponding to the
Aristotelian formal and material causes, are for him principles; the second, which
correspond to the Aristotelian final and efficient causes, are causes proper; he speaks
of the third as extrinsic principles. These are then the three ways in which an entity
depends directly on something as on a causal origin. Because his terminology is often
equivocal, I call these causal origins IN-causes, OUT-causes, and OUTIN-causes,
respectively.
The OUTIN-causes are largely novel in this causal tripartition; even if Averroes
speaks of causes that are both intrinsic and extrinsic (cf. De origine I, 4), this appears
not to be what Dietrich conceives as OUTIN-causes. In De origine I, 25, Dietrich
writes about these OUTIN-causes:
This way is that in which something is a principle [an IN-cause] for
another [B] in such a way that by virtue of this very principle existing
outside the essence [an OUT-cause] of that whose [B’s] principle it is, by
virtue of that same principle does it [B], whose principle it is, nevertheless
subsist formally, inasmuch as it [B] takes from that same existing principle
the notion of its [B’s] entitihood or quiddity from our conception of it.10
9Augusto (2021) provides the translation of De origine I from the Latin into English.
10I shall ad-hocly translate entitas as entitihood, an usual translation, for the sake of consistency
with respect to substancehood and subjecthood, two concepts that also play a central role in my
analysis of De origine II.
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Figure 6: Dietrich’s causal ur-partition of the Aristotelian categories in De origine I.
The Bs are mine, and are added as “annotations” to reduce the high complexity of
this passage that is central in the first part of the De origine. They shall be used to
denote the entities that belong to substances, for which I shall use As. Importantly,
in the cited passage the B-entity is not destitute of its own essence, even if its causal
origin is a principle that is extrinsic to it (in my coinage, an OUTIN-cause). We
can therefore conclude that B “is in itself, and ... is complete in terms of the act
that belongs to it according to its own genus” (De origine I, 1), which is Dietrich’s
definition of entity. These causes then act upon B not in the sense that they cause
B ab nihilo, from nothingness, but in the sense that they provide it with formal
subsistence, which according to Dietrich is the very first way by means of which an
entity differs formally from nothingness or non-being (cf. ibid., 25). But Dietrich’s
originality does not end here; he applies this tripartition of causes to the well-known
list of the ten Aristotelian categories to come up with the ur-partition in Figure 6.11
Later on in part I of the De origine, Dietrich makes a correspondence between the














Mental Act { OUTIN-Cause { Formal subsistence
Figure 7: Dietrich’s ur-segregation of causes. (Source: Augusto, 2021.)
11This originality needs to be mitigated: Avicenna had already by and large proposed the tri-
partition in Figure 6, which was taken up by Albertus Magnus. In particular, reductions among
categories, an important aspect of Dietrich’s foundational ontology (see below), were already com-
mon: For instance, William Ockham actually considered only substance and quality, the remaining
eight categories being reducible to these, and John Buridan reduced all the categories to substance,
quantity, and quality.
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To this ur-segregation, he further applies the distinction between first and second
intentions, central in late medieval philosophy, and after what can be considered
a rather intricate elaboration the top level of an upper ontology can be extracted
as shown in Figure 8. I refer the reader to Augusto (2021) for the details of this
extraction from the viewpoint of formal ontology and as an attempt to bridge this
and philosophical–or mainstream–ontology. In Augusto (2021), this top level is left
open, because of both difficulties posed by the analysis of the original text of the De
origine I, and the fact that Dietrich announces he has yet to address the topic of
the entities caused by a mental act and how they are to be distinguished from mere
things of second intention, being actually things of first intention, a distinction that
is addressed in Section 4.1 below.
This summary of De origine I provides the main elements to facilitate the reading
of De origine II, whose translation from the Latin into English now follows.12
3.2 Treatise on the Origin of the Categories: Translation of
Part 2
On the origin of those entities that are in substances and
generally on all the genera other than the substance
(1) But these entities in this third manner are divided into four different
kinds in degree and order, according to what the degree and the order is in
the manner in which they formally take their entitihood from something
else.13 Given that common to all of them is the fact that they all belong
to an entity, this can be in four ways.14
(2) In one way such that something belongs to an entity according to
the formal and definitive notion of that to which it belongs, namely in
terms of its quiddity.15
12Just as in the translation of Part I in Augusto (2021), I give the references in Dietrich’s text of
ancient and medieval texts exactly as they are given by L. Sturlese in Dietrich of Freiberg (sd/1983).
I refer the reader to this text for the complete bibliographical references. Those added by me are
given in the References.
13Dietrich announces that he is going to elaborate on the entities that take their entitihood from
another entity. Generally taken, they are “those entities that are in substances.” It is important
now to disambiguate between what in part 1 of De origine Dietrich meant by the third kind of
entities–they all have their causal origin in OUTIN-causes–and this more encompassing meaning,
which can be partitioned into four kinds in degree and order. (See Section 4.2.1 for an analysis of
this partition in degree and order.) The key passage here is “the manner in which they formally
take their entitihood from something else” and within this the keyword is “formally.” Dietrich is in
fact expanding the notion of formal subsistence to all the entities that belong to other entities (both
properties and accidents proper; see Fig. 8).
14This is a central notion in Dietrich’s analysis of these entities: They all belong to an A-entity,
being thus classable as B-entities. Dietrich will now specify the notion of belonging at play here:
The B-entities are all in a substance–an A-entity–in the sense that they are attributed to it as a
subject (cf. (7) below). Importantly, this notion of subjecthood is quite diverse and Dietrich specifies
four ways of belonging based on it that I shall see as Types 1 through 4. See Section 4.2 below for a
discussion of this typology and its import for Dietrich’s foundational ontology.
15Type 1 of entities that belong to other entities. This type is that of those B-entities that belong
to an A-entity according to the latter’s own quiddity, a core ontological notion (quiditas, in Latin)
expressing what–quid–an entity is, its complete definition: If one knows the quiddity of an entity,
then one knows what this entity is. This accounts for my choosing “definitive” instead of “defining”:
The former conveys the meaning of both definition and completeness, as the quiddity of an entity
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(3) In a second way such that it is something of an entity according to
that very same entity as a subject.16
(4) In a third way according to the very same subject-entity and ac-
cording to something else that is in that same subject.17
(5) In a fourth way according to these entities just mentioned and in
terms of something else that is in another subject.18
(6) The sufficiency is evident: An entity that depends on another ac-
cording to this manner does not take its entitihood formally from it except
in one of these four ways. Examples of particular cases will be given in
the appropriate places.19
(7) The entities of this third kind are those that are taken in terms of
an analogy by means of which they are attributed to some subject. Which
attribution belongs to them in themselves and in terms of their essence,
hence by virtue of the essence and not according to the sole designation
does the notion of an entity in this way belong to the attributes. Not,
however, as those that are said by attribution to something as to an end,
as urine, diet, and physical exercise are said healthy with respect to the
health of the animal, which is the end, or by attribution to something
efficient, as a diet or a herb is said medicinal by attribution to the medical
or to the art of medicine, which properly is the efficient in this kind: This
is thus accidental to the attributes, whence they are indeed not by essence
that which is predicated of them according to this attribution. And these
three manners of the analogy are distinguished in the commentary on the
beginning of Book IV of the Metaphysics.20
(8) Therefore, because they are certain manners of an entity in terms
of its quiddity, that is, of the definitive notion stating the cause or the
reason why (propter quid) of such entities, those that belong to the first
kind have the nature and the character of properties, and they are not
accidents proper except in the broad sense of the term, inasmuch as the
does not change. Dietrich does not see this first type as having to do directly with the notion of
subjecthood with respect to A, reason why I shall call this Subjecthood−.
16Type 2: The distinguishing aspect here is that these B-entities belong to an A-entity inasmuch
as this acts as a subject for them. It is crucial here to bear in mind that the Latin word subiectum,
from which the English noun subject originates, is a translation of the Greek present participle
hypokéımenon, literally translatable as “(is) lying under.” This Type 2 might be said to rest upon
Subjecthood0, Dietrich’s most basic notion of subjecthood.
17Type 3: These B-entities are those that are in an A-entity in a double sense, according both
to A as subject and to something else (C) that is to be found in A. I call this Subjecthood+.
18Type 4: These are those B-entities that are in an A-entity in virtue of something else (an entity
D) that is in another subject (C). I propose we call this Subjecthood++.
19So, this fourfold typology–which corresponds in fact to an ontological ur-partition–is exhaustive
in the sense that it covers all the B-entities, and apparently also exclusive, as it implicates only these
entities.
20Averroes, In Aristotelis Met. IV, comm. 2, Venetiis 1562, 65rF-vI. Dietrich clarifies here the
ontological (vs. merely linguistic or logical) sense in which these entities of the third kind are to be
considered attributes of an A-entity“in themselves and in terms of their essence,”and not accidentally
as OUT-causes. Importantly, this third kind of entities comprises more entities now than in part 1
of De origine, in which the third kind was constituted by entities caused by an OUTIN-cause (see
Fig. 6); now the entities of the third kind are all those entities that belong to another entity, called
here B-entities for the sake of clarity, regardless in principle of their causal origins. This said, it will
be shown that in fact they all have their causal origin in an OUTIN-cause.
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character of a subject is attributed to that whose properties they are, and
to the formal notion, which is the definitive notion, the character of cause
is attributed. Thus, according to this, these are understood as having the
manner of accidents, which are in a subject thanks to a cause.21
(9) These entities, however, are of two kinds. Some are in a thing
in terms of its essence in itself and absolutely, and all these entail a de-
privation in that thing; of them all the first kinds are the one and the
many. I mean to say that such entities are really privative.22 Indeed, an
entity cannot by virtue of its essence be in an absolute way to itself the
cause of some positive23 information.24 The relation of an entity to such
a manner is like that of a subject to a form, under whose act a subject
cannot make itself. Nonetheless, an entity can, by virtue of its essence, be
the cause of the removal of extraneous determinations, which is but to be
the cause of some privative manners in relation to itself. Although such
entities really entail a deprivation, sometimes reason dresses them with
certain positive manners so that they can be thought of as being certain
manners of an entity in terms of properties; and this happens when such
entities are defined from the subject genus;25 by means of which they are
already something of an entity, i.e., of a subject genus according to its
formal notion. And thus they take their quiddity and their entitihood
formally from the subject genus, as for example even and odd from the
number, equal and unequal from one in quantity, similar and dissimilar
from one in quality, and similarly for the others.26
(10) But there are other entities that are in a thing in terms of its
essence but in relation to some other thing, and these can entail some-
thing positively in their subject in the manner of a property. The reason
for this is that they are not taken from the notion of the thing that is the
subject in itself and absolutely, as the above mentioned, but are conceived
in a thing from a relation to some positive entity, as are the cause and the
caused, the active potency and the passive potency, and certain relative
determinations and the like, if such are things which such manners and
21Type-1 entities, or properties. They are not accidents proper, though they can be understood
as having the manner of accidents, inasmuch as they can be attributed to a subject A in terms of its
quiddity taken as a cause, namely an IN-cause. This very broad notion of accident entails, in turn,
a minimal notion of subjecthood, here referred to as Subjecthood−, where the superscript “−”
denotes this minimality. The rationale seems to be here that the subject in this type is ultimately
that without which a property would not subsist (formally).
22Or depriving, a more common adjective. But privative is more directly opposed to positive, the
latter meaning that something is posited.
23The opposite of privative.
24Read “in-form-ation,” the action of inserting a form.
25Genus subiectum, to be distinguished from the genus praedicabile, or logical genus. This distinc-
tion was particularly important for the definition and the autonomy of the diverse sciences, and it
actually originates in Aristotle. Dietrich, however, employs it here in a strictly ontological setting,
in which “subject genus” can be rephrased as “the genus (of the thing) that is considered as subject.”
26This is Type 1.1: These entities are in a subject according to its formal notion, from which
they take their own quiddity; more precisely, they take their quiddity and their entitihood from the
subject genus. (See footnote 25 for the meaning of this concept.) For example, even and odd belong
to a number according to its formal notion. Their absence may cause a deprivation in an entity: A
number without the property of being even or odd lacks–is deprived of–this essential feature of its.
Type-1.1 are thus properties proper.
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similar ones might befit by essence. These manners take the notion of their
entitihood from the formal notion of the subject genus, but in relation to
some other thing, and from this they have the character of properties, just
like the above mentioned. And since in this manner they are something
belonging to an entity, this is their essence, which according to the said
manner they formally take from some other thing by virtue of the no-
tion that nevertheless determines and makes this, which notion according
to this manner determines and makes them be proper determinations of
entities.27 They are not from a natural act.28
(11) Which is firstly evident from the end, because, as it was said,
those entities that are from a natural act are the principle of some natural
operation. But these are not like that.29
(12) It is also evident from the nature of the thing from whose formal
notion they are taken. Although a thing can, by its essence, be the princi-
ple and the cause of the removal from itself of extraneous determinations,
it cannot actualize itself according to some naturally real form, unless such
a thing be distinct in its parts in such a way, so as to have in itself the
principle of its motion and to be moved by itself, as it is the case with the
animated entities. But we do not talk here of such determinations that
in the animated entities are acquired from themselves: Indeed, all such
forms, as well as other natural forms, respect some real transmutation.30
(13) It is also evident in the third place from the proper character
and nature of these entities, because, as it was said, they are actually but
either a deprivation, which formally is a non-entity, or, if they establish
something positive in relation to some other thing, then they are in such
a way that, whether that thing exists or not, really or mentally, they in-
exist or do not in-exist without any natural transmutation, which is not
possible in forms that entail some natural thing.31
(14) Therefore, one ought to accept their principle and cause in the
27Type 1.2: These B-entities are in an A-entity according to its essence, but in relation to
something else. Examples are the cause in relation to the caused and the active potency in relation
to the passive potency. These entities, whose presence in a subject entails something positively–i.e.
that is posited–in it, are said to have the manner of properties, reason why I shall call them quasi-
properties. “Relation” is a key word in this passage, as below in this text Dietrich will reduce some
of the relations to these properties.
28Dietrich means not only the Type-1.2 entities, but also the Type-1.1 ones, as it will be evident
below. This is a wholly new perspective, as in De origine I the properties appeared to be attributed
to IN-causes, namely the formal cause alone, and the IN-causes seemed to be associated with a
natural act (see Fig. 8).
29First reason why the (quasi-)properties are not caused by a natural act: They are not the
principle (an IN-cause?) of a natural operation.
30Second reason why the (quasi-)properties are not caused by a natural act: Now the onus falls
on the nature of the things to which the (quasi-)properties belong, as it is the case that they cannot
actualize themselves according to some naturally real form. There is indeed the case when a thing,
namely an animated entity, has in itself the IN-cause for its ability to move, but this is an instance
of a real transmutation, something that has nothing to do with quasi-properties, Dietrich appears to
argue.
31Third reason why the (quasi-)properties are not caused by a natural act: This seems to be
a rehash of the second reason, with the additional information that when existing in a thing as
a positive determination they do not entail any natural transmutation; indeed, this thing may be
purely mental, or imaginary. (If they are a deprivation in a thing, then they simply are non-entities.)
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intellect as effective,32 in the substance or the essence of a thing as sub-
jective,33 and in the notion of a thing as originating and informative.34
In fact, the subject or whatever form in a subject cannot be the efficient
cause of some thing according to nature except with respect to another
subject. Concerning the notion of the cause and of the caused, just as they
differ in the concept, so, too, in the subject they are distinct. And because
nature does not distinguish between the thing-subject and the notion of
the thing-subject, the principle of this distinction being the intellect–or
rather the intellect is the constituent of the notion of a thing as such, as it
will be shown below–, those entities that are brought out from the formal
notion of a thing are therefore produced by the intellect.35
(15) Therefore, firstly and originally our agent intellect thanks to its
universal and exceedingly formal faculty, and next the possible intellect ac-
tualized with respect to the apprehension of a thing as regards its quiddity
and formal notion, in this way, I say, actualized according to a determinate
form from the quiddity of a thing, brings out such entities and actualizes
the entitihood in them, so that this is the first formal notion of their entiti-
hood, because they are entities according to the aforementioned manner.36
According to this, a natural entity belongs thanks to the intellect to their
quiddity and falls in their definition, and this is the first root and origin
of all those entities that are by an act of the intellect as far as what they
are is concerned and that are things of first intention, and to which origin
it is necessary to reduce the entitihood of all such entities as being the
first principle of such a kind of entities that is from an operation of the
intellect.37
(16) Even though such entities according to the aforementioned man-
ner acquire a certain entitihood, nevertheless they still do not completely
32That produces an effect.
33That acts as a subject.
34The notion of the thing that acts as a subject is the causal origin of these B-entities by providing
them with form, i.e. by in-forming them.
35Dietrich now talks of three causal origins: efficient cause (an OUT-cause), subjecthood (an
OUTIN-cause; see Section 4.2.1), and formal cause (an IN-cause). The two last ones are to be found
in the substance to which the (quasi-)properties belong, but they are so thanks to the intellect, as
nature cannot distinguish the thing-subject and the notion of the thing-subject; the first one is more
directly attributed to the human intellect, which acts as the efficient cause of these entities. So,
we do indeed have here what can be called OUTIN-causes for these B-entities, and the role of the
human mind as a causal origin in relation to them is now made explicit: The intellect not only acts
as an efficient cause, but it is also related to the formal cause, as it is the constituent of a thing’s
notion, as well as to the subjecthood of a thing, because nature does not distinguish between the
thing-subject (i.e. a thing that acts as a subject) and its notion as such. Summing up, Dietrich
appears to argue that (quasi-)properties have their causal origin entirely in the human mind, but
this entails that Subjecthood− and the corresponding A-entity considered under this concept also
have their causal origin in the intellect.
36See Section 4.1.2 below for the contextualization of this distinction between the agent and possible
intellects and its meaning for Dietrich.
37See Figure 10 below for the relation between first intentions and natural entities in late medieval
ontology. Dietrich not only claims that the (quasi-)properties have their causal origin in the human
mind, but also sees them as things of first intention, which have a superior ontological status with
relation to the things of second intention. This is what in Augusto (2021) I call Dietrich’s “second
bomb.”
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have the character of an entity nor are they in any of the ten genera
but as properties of the same genera. However, they completely have the
character of an entity inasmuch as it suffices to constitute some genus of
category if they, from whose formal notion these are taken, are natural
determinations of some entity, as shall be discussed below.38
(17) Thus, these are the entities of the first kind of those that accord-
ing to the third manner proposed in the beginning take their entitihood
formally from another entity and universally belong to entities in them-
selves and are proper affections, and such entities are found in general in
all kinds of entities, of substances as much as of accidents.39 And because
of this, it is the very first kind.
(18) But the second kind of entities that takes the notion of its en-
titihood formally from another entity is that which belongs to an entity
solely in terms of a subject as subject. And thus among the nine gen-
era of accidents, which this kind firstly and essentially befits, are the real
quantities and qualities, which entail some natural thing with respect to
a substance.40
(19) But something can have the character of a subject in two ways.
In one way, inasmuch as something is subjected to something else formally
inhering in itself, so that out of it some single entity becomes as from a
subject and a form. In another way, or in another notion according to
which some entity, in subsisting, sustains some nature or determination
adhering to itself.41
(20) I therefore say that these entities of this second kind take their
entitihood inasmuch as entities formally from another entity in terms of
subject, not in the manner of the substanding or according to that notion
that substands some form, either substantial or accidental–in fact, this
manner is that of some existing entity in potency and having the character
of matter, hence such entities, which according to this manner only in-
exist, would not take the notion of their entitihood formally from it, but
only according to their being reduced to their causes, that is, inasmuch as
38The (quasi-)properties, taken as a product of a mental act, have an “incomplete” entitihood
and can be considered as merely properties of the ten categories, not constituting thus a distinct
category; but they do indeed constitute a genus of category if they are taken from the formal notion
of an entity that is a natural determination, namely quality or quantity. It appears that in this case
the quasi-properties are properties simpliciter.
39Summing up: The (quasi-)properties, which have their causal origin in the human mind and are
things of first intention, belong not only to substances, but also to the accidents.
40Dietrich will now address the Type-2 B-entities, to recall, those that belong to an entity in terms
of a subject as subject, what I call Subjecthood0. We are told straightaway that these are among the
nine genera of accidents, being first and foremost the quantity and the quality, the two accidents that
entail some natural thing with respect to a substance. In Origine I, Dietrich appeared to attribute
to quantity an IN-cause and an OUT-cause to the qualities (see Fig. 6); in any case, these two
categories have natural causes, what Dietrich expresses also by means of the adjective “real.”
41An entity can act as a subject in two ways: As being subjected to something else that inheres
to it, or as sustaining something else that adheres to it. In the first case, there is a single entity
composed as from a subject and a form; in the second, both the subject and that which adheres to it
are separated/separable. We can see these as Types 2.1 and 2.2 of Subjecthood0, respectively, and
I shall call the corresponding B-entities inherents and adherents. As the qualities and the quantities
are of Type 2.2, we may tentatively conclude that the remaining seven Aristotelian accidents fall in
Type 2.1. (See Figure 13 below.)
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an agent cause makes such entities in a subject in relation to some end–,
but I say that these entities belong to an entity in terms of subject in the
manner of the subsisting in itself and essentially; however, they become
and are in it as in a manner of adherence, as its natural determinations, but
outside its nature, determining it by adhering.42 What makes it so that,
given that such an entity is an entity simpliciter in terms of its absolute
subsistence, and thus in an exceedingly formal way, those entities that are
in the aforementioned way take the notion of their entitihood from it and
are formally entities, because they are determinations of such an entity.
And this is their essence.43
(21) And because by the term determination or adherence something
of accidentality appears to be entailed, one must take this accidentality
on the side of the subject to which it happens to be thus determined; but,
on the other hand, to be determinations of such a subject is the essence
of such entities, according to which their analogy to a substance in terms
of the notion of entity is considered, and this is common to all the nine
genera, as is shown in Book IV of the Metaphysics.44
(22) What properly characterizes these entities of this second kind is
that, in respect to what they are, they are not brought out from the
definitive notion of a subject, as the aforementioned, but have their cause
in nature, thanks to which they happen in a subject in relation to some
end.45
(23) They only take the character of an entity inasmuch as entities from
a subject according to the aforementioned manner. Hence, this certain
order is considered: First an entity having a cause is constituted in being
by its causes; next, its formal entitihood is considered in it in terms of the
quiddity and of the form; then, from this formal notion in it its natural
property, inasmuch as it is an entity, is considered.46
42From this paragraph on, Dietrich largely restricts the B-entities of Type 2–what he refers to
as “the second kind”–to the adherents (Type 2.2). He will retake the inherents only as B-entities
of Type 4, but will then reduce these to Type 3, which is in turn reducible to Types 2 and 1. See
Section 4.2.5 below for the final result of this complex ontological reductionism.
43This whole paragraph makes for another knotty passage, in which, however, the key words are
determination and adherence: By being (natural) determinations of–which they are by adhering
to–an entity that is per se in terms of its absolute subsistence (and hence subsisting formally per se)
these two accidents, the quantity and the qualities, so to say “participate” of this superior ontological
status. This is Type 2.2. Importantly, here subjecthood is not to be understood in the sense of that
which substands, or acts as a substratum or support, to an accident (Type 2.1); this latter type of
subjecthood can only be found in material things and in their being in potency, and it requires both
OUT-causes, the final and efficient causes.
44Aristotle, Met. IV, 2, 1003b5-6. Interestingly, the accidentality of the quantity and the quality
does not fall into the essence or definition of these accidents, but rather on that of the subject,
to which it happens to be determined by them; this notwithstanding, being determinations of a
substance is their own essence, and by an analogy with it they are also substances, just like all the
other accidents.
45The verb happen translates here the Latin verb form fiunt ; this could also be translated as
become or be made, but happen is more immediately associated with accidentality. Dietrich is now
addressing all the entities of Type 2, regardless of the distinction between its subtypes. He will
readdress the distinction from paragraph (25) onward.
46Dietrich proposes the following causality-based hierarchy for a B-entity that takes its entitihood
from a subject according to Subjecthood0: (I) The B-entity is originated thanks to OUT-causes; (II)
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(24) Although in the first manner an entity takes its origin essentially,47
the notion of an entity in the second manner is more essential and more
formal and proper;48 the third of the aforementioned manners,49 that is,
its natural property inasmuch as it is an entity, is derived from the second.
Concerning the first manner, these entities of which we talk are made by
an agent in a subject and have the character of natural entities, as was
said above of the substances; regarding the second manner, in each one of
them the notion of entity inasmuch as an entity is considered; from which
in the third place is derived their natural property, which is to be in a
subject, according to Avicenna.50
(25) One must also consider that the notion and the manner of these
entities vary in relation to the subject according to the way the notion of
the subject varies.
(26) For if a subject is considered in terms of that which substands,
in this way an accidental entity is constituted from the subject and from
them, of which accidental entity the same subject is a part in terms of
matter and of that existing in potency, but those entities that exist in it
have the character of the form and of that existing in act. And according
to this they are seen to have both the name and the character of accidents,
and are distinct from the substance, according to what is said a substance
from that which substands.51
(27) But according to what is said a substance from that which sub-
sists, which is a notion of substance more formal than the one previously
mentioned, according to this these entities are distinct according to their
own notions and the name of each of the genera, under the name of, to
wit, quantity, quality, and similarly for the others, because according to
this manner their own notion, thanks to which they are entities, and which
they take from a more formal entity that is the substance, is considered.
And thus, with respect to the fact that in them that which they are ac-
cidentally is considered, they are more formal than the substances; but
with respect to the fact that in them that which they are essentially is
considered, and this is their essence according to the notion thanks to
which they are entities, the subject is more formal than them.52
the IN-causes then provide it with its quiddity and form; (III) this formal notion gives it its property
of being a natural entity.
47Dietrich refers here to I (see footnote above).
48II.
49III.
50Avicenna, Logica I, Venetiis, 1508, 9va, l. 54-60; Averroes, In Aristotelis Metaph. V, comm. 14,
ed. Ponzalli, 130.
51While accidentally constituting a single entity as from a subject (an A-entity) and a form, the
Type-2.1 B-entities have a full-fledged entitihood, existing in act independently of the subject that
substands with respect to them.
52Summing up (26)-(27): There are thus two notions of substancehood, to wit, something is a
substance in the sense that it substands (literally: stands under or underlies) or in the sense that it
subsists. The latter notion is more formal than the former. If we consider substancehood in terms
of the former notion, then the subject (the substance), merely in potency, “contributes” with the
matter, and the in-existing entities–accidents proper–do so with the form and their being in act, or
entelechy (see paragraph immediately above). But if we consider substancehood from the viewpoint
of that which subsists, then the in-existing entities are in fact principles, or IN-causes, of the natural
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(28) Thus the entities of this second kind are those that entail in the
substances certain natures that are principles of their natural operations
or changes. Which can be in two ways, as was mentioned above.
(29) In such a way that they are principles of such changes essentially
and primarily. And these are real qualities, according to which things
either act or are acted upon, or are determined in terms of some perfection
appropriate to themselves according to nature. Hence the Philosopher in
Book V of the Metaphysics53 determines the notion of quality in relation
to change.
(30) In another way they are certain principles of such operations or
changes, or even perfections, indeed essentially, but not primarily. And
these are those that are, as it were, indispensable to that end, as the
quantity and the local change, as was said above.54
(31) But this raises a question. Given that nature determines for differ-
ent things, determinate according to the species, different and determinate
quantities and changes, but to each its own quality according to the spe-
cific being that each one has, the second manner, in which it was said that
certain entities take their entitihood formally from some other entity in
terms of subject, does not appear to differ from the first, where it was said
that certain entities take their entitihood from another entity according
to its formal and specific notion.55
(32) But we must consider that it is for one reason that something takes
its entitihood from some other entity by virtue of the notion of its quiddity
from its formal notion as in an eliciting way,56 but for another reason if it
takes its entitihood from another entity according to its specific nature as
in a subjective way. The first of these befits the first manner mentioned
above, namely inasmuch as reason distinguishes between a subject or a
thing and its formal notion and from this it brings out such entities ac-
tualizing in them the entitihood. The second of these befits this second
manner, inasmuch as nature, which cannot distinguish between a thing
and its formal notion, determines different formal natures of determinate
species with respect to different things according to their determinate spe-
cific natures, not from their specific nature or formal notion, but rather
according to itself, as was said.57
operations or changes of the subject. These B-entities exhibit the interesting property that they are
more formal than the substance if they are seen from the viewpoint of their being accidents, but the
substance is more formal than them if they are considered from the perspective of their own essence,
as this is that they are entities that belong to another entity.
53Aristotle, Met. V, 14, 1020b8-25.
54Summing up (28)-(30): A new distinction, now with respect to a subject’s natural operations or
changes; those entities that are“principles”of such changes essentially and primarily are the qualities,
those that are so essentially but not primarily are the quantities. (Dietrich’s own lexical distinctions
are not always respected by him; in this case, “principles” appears to be used to mean both IN-causes
and OUT-causes.)
55Question: It appears that these Type-2.2 entities are not really different from the Type-1 entities,
the (quasi-)properties, a problem that is posed by the supposed causal role of nature.
56Elicitive, in the Latin text. In other passages I consistently translate the verb elicere as to bring
out, inasmuch as Dietrich of Freiberg uses this verb to convey the idea that the B-entities are brought
out from the A-entities by means of an operation. Importantly, this is a mental operation.
57Another distinction: An entity can take its entitihood from some other entity in an eliciting or
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(33) From these two manners or kinds of entities the following other
two originate.
(34) The third kind of entities is the one that has its entitihood formally
and in terms of subject from another entity, and this in a completing way,
but originally from another entity that is considered in that subject.58 And
such entities are those that are classed in themselves according to their
own notions in one of the ten genera in such a way that they do not entail
any nature or any naturally real determination regarding a substance with
respect to that which formally and primarily is signified by the term, but
have on account of their notion some nature that it is necessary to consider
in that subject. Such entities are those that belong to the genus of relation,
as well as certain others.59
(35) I say “those that belong to the genus of relation,” but not all
relative determinations belong to this manner nor to the kind of category
that is a relation to something, for example if some are relations according
solely to reason and not in reality. Which indeed happens when the sub-
jects of such relations are not entities but according to reason, or if their
extremes are not distinct but according to reason, as when, for example,
the same thing is related to itself under the same relation.60 But the real
relations by means of which some entities are related by their essence and
not by some nature found in the subject do not belong properly to this
manner nor to the kind of category that is a relation to something; they
belong to the first manner, as it was said there. The reason why they are
removed from this categorial genus will be seen below.61
(36) The Philosopher distinguishes in Book V of the Metaphysics62
two general manners of all relative entities, to wit, that some are relative
essentially, some are so accidentally. These two manners are found in the
relatives in a twofold way.63
(37) In one way, in the simply correlatives when such relatives or the
in a subjective way. The former is Type 1, the latter is Type 2.2. The first is attributed to reason,
the second to nature. This attribution can be taken as eliminating the natural causes with respect
to the Type-1 entities.
58Subjecthood+, or Type-3 B-entities.
59The Aristotelian category of relation includes some of the B-entities of this third type, which are
characterized by having their own entitihood formally and in terms of subject from another entity
(A) in a completing way, i.e. in a manner that entails completion or accomplishment (completive),
but originally from another entity (C) that is also considered in A. Importantly, these B-entities do
not entail any nature or any naturally real determination with respect to the A-entities. Dietrich
further informs the reader that, besides relations, this Type 3 comprises certain other entities, but
he does not specify what (accidents?) they are.
60Relations solely according to reason are in fact not Type-3 B-entities. Dietrich specifies that a
relation is solely according to reason when the subjects are really not entities, being merely beings
of reason, or when the correlatives are one and the same entity, constituting what we know today as
a reflexive relation.
61On the other hand, real relations according to which some entities are related by their own
essence and not by some nature in the subject are not relations proper, being rather properties,
or Type-1 B-entities. We have already some of the Type-3 B-entities that are not relations, as
announced in paragraph (34).
62Aristotle, Met. V, 15, 1021b3-11.
63Dietrich is now going to elaborate on his interpretation of the relations for Aristotle, namely in
his Book V of Metaphysics.
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very relations need not be specific to a genus of category, as, for instance,
if some relatives are related to each other by their essence, like the cause
and the caused, each one of the correlatives is related by itself and not
by a relation that is in a genus. But if some entities are related to each
other by their essence, like the measure and the measured, which kind of
relation is considered between a first entity and other substances of things,
then in fact one entity is understood to be related by itself, but the other
is so accidentally, as the Philosopher says in Book V.64
(38) In another way, it is found both by itself and accidentally in the
correlatives by means of a relation specific to a proper genus; these are
in that categorial genus that is a relation to something, and they belong
to this third manner already mentioned. The active and the passive not
by their essence, but by some accidental nature found in a substance,
in the same way as those correlatives whose relation is founded on some
numerical proportion, like the equal and the unequal and their species, es-
sentially are relatives regarding each of the extremes and are classed in a
determinate genus, which is the relation to something.65 Although knowl-
edge and the knowable, and sense and the sensible are indeed essentially
relatives with respect to one of the extremes, with respect to the other
they are so accidentally, and according to this they are either essentially
or accidentally specific to a genus.66
(39) If, however, there are entities of which one is causal or moving
by its essence but the other is moved according to some accidental de-
termination introduced in it by the moving, the very moving will indeed
be a correlative essentially, but by a relation not specific to a genus; but
by the relation that is in a genus that properly has the character of an
accident, it is not related except by accident, but the very moved is re-
lated essentially by this kind of relation.67 According to this distinction
and difference of the relatives, it is seen among the theologians that some-
times they attribute to God an essential relation to the creatures, other
times they take this manner of relation away from him, saying that he is
related to a creature only accidentally or according to reason, of which
manners each is true according to the aforementioned different notion of
the correlatives; according to which difference it is seen among them that
sometimes the relations by means of which God relates to a creature are
64Aristotle, Met. V, 15, 1021a26-30.
65Recall that Dietrich had considered the active and the passive, as well as the equal and the
unequal, as Type-1 B-entities, or (quasi-)properties.
66See Table 1 in Section 4.2.4 for a summary of Dietrich’s discussion of the Aristotelian category
of relation.
67Dietrich considers now the relation between an entity E that has causal or moving powers (where
by “moving power” mostly “capable of causing change”–in the sense of metabolé–is meant; see above)
and a moved entity F. Two cases: (i) in a relation not specific to a genus, E is causal or moving
by its essence but F is moved according to some accidental determination introduced in it by E;
(ii) in a relation that is specific to a genus, namely a genus that properly has the character of an
accident, E is related by accident but F is so essentially. These are respectively types A.2 and
B.2 of relation in Table 1 below. Note that if we call E “the mover” and F “the moved,” these two
types of relation invert the positions of both correlatives, it being the case that the first correlative
is essentially involved in the relation, whereas the second is so accidentally: We have (i) the mover
and the moved, and (ii) the moved and the mover.
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accidents, and sometimes they are not so.68
(40) Hence Anselm in the Monologion, c. 25, asking in which way
God can be known as being invariable not only substantially, but also
accidentally, given that he receives in himself relative accidents by means
of which he relates to a creature, answers with these words: “But what is
the inconsistency between the receptivity of those that are said accidents
and natural immutability if from their assumption no change results in a
substance?” And below: “For just as the supreme nature in its simplicity
never undergoes a change by means of the efficient accidents, so it does
not disdain to be expressed according to those accidents which in no way
are inconsistent with the supreme immutability.” And he conjectures on
the different character of an accident of this kind as follows: “Just as
those accidents that, by their presence or absence, cause some change
are assessed by their very effect on the thing they actually change, so
those that lack a similar effect are considered to be improperly called
accidents.” And he reaches the conclusion in the same chapter that the
relative accidents cause a change in a relative way in a subject, namely
because they are not as relations, but for a natural reason, which is the
foundation of the relation, as are the degrees of heat and the colors and
the like, as he says in the same place.69 Augustine expresses the same
opinion on the relations in the last chapter of Book V of On the trinity.70
(41) However, some authors71 want to call the relatives by accident, of
which we spoke, relatives according to reason, but the meaning is not to
be made in the words, unless it correspond to the truth of things. There
is an aspect regarding this that must be considered: That the concept of
these manners, to wit, essential and accidental, is in such a way that these
belong to the same class, so that if one of them is in reality, the other is
in reality, which is evident from the nature and the notion of the origin of
that which is accidentally from that which is essentially. In fact, the notion
of that which is accidentally consists in a certain analogy with that which
is essentially. Hence, that which is essentially falls in its very definition;
this is not so with those that differ according to these differences, which
are in reality and according to reason. However, that which is accidentally
68God is introduced as playing the role of E; the creatures, or the caused entities in theological
jargon, are the F-entities. According to the theologians, both cases above appear to apply in this
relation, so that God is involved in it either essentially or accidentally. (Incidentally, note that
Dietrich is not including himself among the theologians.) But what if accidents and their manner
(i.e. accidentality) are products of reason alone? How can one then account for the accidental
relations of God to the creatures? Dietrich argues below that in fact accidentality, if taken in a
certain analogy, does not differ from essentiality.
69“Foundation” translates here “fundamentum,” a term that will occur frequently in Dietrich’s
elaboration in paragraphs (49) through (53). This Latin term is often translated as “fundament”
or “ground,” but my preference for “foundation” is accounted for by the fact that the main subject
of this article is precisely the categories taken in a foundational sense (see Section 2 above). In
effect, fundamentum was used to express the foundation of a relation with respect to a subject as
that which the subject is substantially, i.e. that which the subject is besides being a subject to the
relation. For a brief explanation of fundamentum in the context of the Christian doctrine of the
Trinity (see next footnote), see Section 4.2.4 below.
70Augustine, De Trin. V, 16, n. 17; PL 42/922-924.
71Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent. d. XXX, q. 1, a. 1. comm.; Summa theol. I, q. 13, a. 7 comm.
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can be said to be according to reason in a broad sense, as our venerable
doctors of theology72 often use it in this way.73
(42) But let us go back to the proposed in general concerning the en-
tities of this third kind. And because the notion of such entities inasmuch
as entities is taken both from the subject and from something else that
is considered in the same subject, as it was said, that is why they belong
to the kind of such entities that are forms happening intrinsically:74 Al-
though some of them require something extrinsic under the aspect of the
term, they do not require it so that they take the notion of their entitihood
from that, as it is evident in the case of relations.
(43) But these are originated from the two kinds named first in this
manner.
(44) Firstly, these entities take their entitihood from something else
according to its formal notion; and according to this they have the manner
of properties of something natural and are therefore seen to belong to the
first aforementioned kind.75
(45) However, they receive the nature and the manner of an entity
classable76 in a genus due to the fact that the thing according to whose
formal and definitive reason they are taken from is a natural determination
of some substance; which pertains to the aforementioned second kind.77
(46) From this now in the third place these are to a substance as its
determinations and accidental manners, and they are entities, because
they belong to an entity, namely a substance, according to the manner of
the subject in which they are, not as brought out from its formal notion,
but, as it was said, accidentally through that nature and with that nature
from which they primarily and originally take their entitihood in that
same existing subject, as it was said, for example continuous quantity, as
it is a determination of a substance and truly a real accident according to
nature.78
(47) According to this, the one, which is taken in terms of continuous
quantity regarding a corporeal substance, receives the nature of an acci-
dent classable in a genus and is the principle of the number, which follows
the division of the continuous, according to the Philosopher,79 and it is an
accident in the corporeal things. However, the one, immediately related
72Dietrich refers implicitly to Thomas Aquinas, with some of whose doctrines he notoriously dis-
agreed. Note how this implicit reference contrasts with the explicit references to Anselm and Au-
gustine.
73This short aside in paragraphs (39) through (41) appears to aim at establishing reason as a
causal origin on the same footing with nature. See Section 4.2.4 below.
74Translating “advenientes” as “happening,” in order to emphasize the accidental nature of these
entities. See paragraph (56) below for additional remarks on this.
75Dietrich appears to reduce the relations to properties of natural entities (Type 1).
76That can be placed in a class.
77In fact, Dietrich reduces the relations (B-entities) to natural determinations (C-entities) of some
substance A, i.e. Type-2 B-entities. But the Type-1 B-entities are never unequivocally reduced to
these, which leaves us confronted with an ontological association between Type-1 and Type-2 B-
entities that is unspecified.
78Quantity, a natural determination of a substance, can be either continuous or discrete, so that
this is a real accident according to nature.
79Aristotle, Met. V, 15, 1021a12-13; ibid. V, 6, 1016b17-18; ibid. X, 1, 1052b20-24.
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to a substance, all accidents having been circumscribed or removed from
the substance, does not have the nature or the manner of an accident
classable in a genus, but only that of a natural property of that which
produces such an entity. And what was said of the one is equally true of
those other entities that belong to this type.80
(48) Nevertheless, because these entities, as well all other entities that
are in substances, have the character of an entity according to an analogy
with a substance, we must consider about these entities, according to
what was said above, that the entitihood of those that are constituted in
some of the ten genera consists in a double analogy. Firstly, they in some
way receive the character of an entity according to the formal notion of
some other natural entity, as was said.81 However, this natural entity82 is
a remoter entity, because it is an accident or a natural determination
of a true entity, which is a substance.83 And in this way the notion
of this analogy may formally complete the notion of the first analogy
in constituting these entities, so that they may signify a thing of first
intention classable in a genus.84
(49) And this is what some85 mean, to wit, that the reality of such
entities is but the reality of their foundation.86
(50) Indeed, if they understand by the term “thing” or “reality” some
nature or natural determination, then it is agreed that such a reality is
solely found in the foundation of such entities.87 Although formally and
primarily they do not signify it by the term, they entail it from their
concept regarding a substance, and it is almost the same as, if I understood
by the term “entity” only that which subsists essentially and absolutely, I
would be saying that the whole entitihood of whatever accident is but the
entitihood of the foundation, which is a substance.
80Dietrich uses the one to exemplify the reduction of the B-entities of Type 3 to both Type-1 and
Type-2.2 B-entities: If we consider the one (a B-entity) with respect to the continuous quantity
(C-entity) of a corporeal substance (A), then the one is a Type-2.2 B-entity, namely a quantity; if
however it is taken as immediately related to a substance simpliciter, no C-entity being considered,
then it is a natural property, a Type-1 B-entity, more specifically a Type-1.1 B-entity.
81Annotating this passage for clarity: “they [B-entities] in some way receive the character of an
entity according to the formal notion of some other natural entity [a C-entity in A].”
82What is now the C-entity.
83The A-entity. Note how Dietrich refers to this A-entity as a true entity (ens verum) with
respect to the remoter being (ens ulterius) that is the C-entity considered in it as according to
Subjecthood+.
84Dietrich appears to want it so that the ontological status of first intentions, superior to that of
second intentions, be given to the relations. These were, in effect, seen as second intentions, just like
all the other categories other than the substance, but the second intentions were firstly conceived as
the universals, or things of reason. See Figure 10 below.
85E.g., Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V, 2, ad arg., Parisiis 1518, 155rN; ibid. IX 3 corp., 349rT-V; ibid.
IX, 3 ad arg. 1, 35lrE.
86Fundamentum in Latin. (See footnote above on this central term.) According to Henry of Ghent
and also Richard of Middleton, relations have no ontological content–their reality–other than that
of their foundation; from the viewpoint of subjecthood, they add nothing to the subject.
87The Latin word “res” in medieval philosophical jargon was often used in the sense of a reality,
so a countable noun, just like its most common translation, to wit, thing. As an example, res
primae intentionis can be translated into English as either (a) thing of first intention, or (a) reality
of first intention. Importantly in the case at hand, Dietrich writes here on the origin of the res
praedicamentales, often translated as categorial realities, or less commonly, categorial things.
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(51) If, however, they understand by the term“thing”or“reality”what-
ever in whatsoever manner is according to the notion of whatsoever formal
act, thanks to which notion it is a thing of first intention, then their opin-
ion is true with respect to the fact that the formal notion of these entities
and of the foundation is the same: Indeed, the definitive notion stating
the essence (quid est) of that thing that is the foundation is the same as
that stating the cause or the reason why (propter quid) of these entities.
And this is the first notion of a certain entitihood in them, thanks to the
notion actualizing in them this entitihood according to the aforementioned
notion. Just as these entities primarily and originally take a certain enti-
tihood from their foundation, so they take from the same both the nature
of a categorial genus and the nature of an accident with respect to a sub-
stance, namely so that they may have the nature and the manner of real
accidents of a substance.
(52) But if we want to reduce such entities to their causes, then, though
thanks to the notion of the foundation they have a cause in nature, thanks
to the notion of what formally and primarily is signified by the term and in
which the notion of its proper genus consists, they are from an operation
of the intellect. Indeed nature does not bring out or produce anything
from the notion of a thing, just as it does not distinguish between a thing
and the notion of a thing, this being the proper job of the intellect, as it
will be said below.
(53) However, if we remove from such entities the act of reason, then
they are in no way entities with respect to that which is signified by
the term, but there remains the sole reality and the entitihood of the
foundation. And thus in the third way their opinion can be stated to be
true, but less properly, because according to this reflection such entities
are not classed in a proper genus except perhaps according to the sole
designation, according to which the metaphysician does not distinguish
these kinds of things.88
(54) These are then the entities of the third kind, of which it is somehow
evident thanks to which notion they are entities inasmuch as entities, and
to which causes they have to be reduced.
(55) The fourth kind of entities, which as much as the previous kind
depends formally on another entity by essence, is that in which there is
an entity that belongs to an entity in terms of subject, but according to
something else that is considered in that same subject, and originally from
the notion of another entity that is different from the subject. And this is
in terms of the origin the first in the formal notion of this entity.89
(56) And on account of this each one of these entities is said to happen
88See Section 4.2.4 below for a short explanation of the complex content of paragraphs (49) through
(53).
89Dietrich addresses now the Type-4 B-entities, which have their entitihood associated with
Subjecthood++. This is made clearer if we annotate Dietrich’s words: “there is an entity [B] that
belongs to an entity [A] in terms of subject, but according to something else [C] that is considered
in that same subject, and originally from the notion of another entity [D] that is different from the
subject.”
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extrinsically.90 For example, the very“where,”which is a thing of a specific
genus, one of ten, it itself, I say, is an entity because it belongs to an
entity in terms of subject–which is a substance–in that way as was said
above concerning other entities. However, it is in a substance thanks to
its dimensions, which nature regards before the substance itself, and thus
it is in a subject according to something else that is considered in that
same subject. But before anything else it is in a subject in terms of the
containing place, which is something different from the subject, reason why
it is said in On the Six Principles91 that the “where” is the delimitation of
a body proceeding from the delimitation of the place.92 And this applies
to the other entities that belong to the same manner.
(57) The formal notion of these entities has thus an extrinsic origin,
but nature realizes their formality in the subject according to which they
inhere93; in them, the character of an entity is realized by their final
relation to the substance in which they exist.94
(58) These entities are in general in the number of the six genera
of things that are said to be forms happening extrinsically. They must
be reduced to the same manner and to the same causes in genus of the
previous ones which belong to the third kind.95
(59) But one might now ask why it is that in the case of entities that
are taken from the formal and definitive notion of a substance some genus
of category, distinct in its own notion from the genus of the substance, is
not constituted, as we see that this happens according to other genera, for
example, the equal and the unequal in terms of the quantity, in terms of
the quality the similar and the dissimilar, which are certain relations, just
in the same way that the “where” is in terms of the notion of the place,
and similarly for many others.96
90Dietrich writes of these entities that they are “extrinsecus advenientes.” Although the adverb
“extrinsically” may denote OUT-causes, namely an efficient cause (see paragraph (20) above), here
it denotes more immediately something that is extrinsic to, or different from, the subject. Compare
with paragraph (42) above. The distinction between “extrinsecus advenientes” and “intrinsecus
advenientes” was used to qualify the relations directly, namely by Duns Scotus, who spoke of the six
Aristotelian categories here under analysis as relationes extrinsecus advenientes in his Quaestiones
quodlibetales (cf. q. 11, p. 34; John Duns Scotus, sd/1969).
91Liber sex princ. V, 48, ed. Minio Paluello – Dod, 45. This anonymous medieval text aimed
at “remedying” Aristotle’s insufficient discussion in Categories on the accidents other than quantity,
quality, and relation. See Figure 5.
92Dietrich analyzes the category of place under his theory of Subjecthood++; see Section 4.2.5 for
a summary.
93Translating “insunt” according to my interpretation; see Section 4.2.5.
94There are here two aspects to consider: Firstly, but mentioned secondly in this passage, these
Type-4 B-entities are reducible to relations, or Type-3 B-entities, because their entitihood is realized
by the final relation to the substance to which–secondly, but mentioned firstly–they inhere, so Type-
2.1 B-entities. In the case above of place, though it is in a substance first of all thanks to the
containing place, which is extrinsic to the substance, it is its relation to the substance that provides
it with its entitihood.
95So, the Aristotelian categories of place, time, position, state, action, and passion are reduced to
relations, Dietrich’s Type-3 B-entities.
96The equal and the unequal are considered under quantity, the similar and the dissimilar, which
are relations, under quality, just in the same way that the “where” is considered under place, etc. So,
all these B-entities that are taken from the formal and definitive notion of a substance are considered
not directly under the genus of the substance, but rather under other genera (the quantity, the quality,
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(60) But we must consider that this happens differently concerning
the entities that are taken from the notion of a substance and those that
are taken from the notion of the other genera. In fact, those entities
that are from a substance always have the same respect and relation to
the substance, namely as proper accidents and as essential affections of
the substance. Inasmuch as they are taken from a substance in terms of
its quiddity, they cannot respect an entity other than the substance for
the reason that the substance is an entity in itself in terms of absolute
subsistence, reason why they belong to the same genus of the substance
as properties.97
(61) However, the things of the other genera can be considered in a
twofold way. In one way, in terms of their nature in itself and absolutely,
without the notion of the subject, and those that in this way are conceived
from their own notion are considered to be proper manners of such natures
and have the character of properties.98 And according to this they cannot
but have the character of a proper genus, from whose proper notion they
are taken.99
(62) In another way are the things of the other genera considered in
relation to a subject, inasmuch as they are certain determinations of a
substance. And in this way some things can be taken from their notion
regarding a substance as manners and determinations of the substance.
And thus each of such entities has some proper character of a specific
genus, inasmuch as it is taken in this way from the notion of some nature,
not so that it be some manner or property of that same nature, but so that
according to that very nature it be some manner and a determination of a
substance.100 A property as such is contained within the nature and the
notion of the proper genus of the subject;101 but that which is conceived
in terms of some nature is conceived with respect to something else, as a
form having the proper notion of something of a specific kind relative to
a substance, though in its concept it entails, relative to a substance, the
nature of that genus from whose notion it is taken. And these are the
entities that belong to the third and fourth kinds, as was said before.102
the relation, the place, etc.). Why is it that these six accidents do not constitute a specific genus,
like the quantity, the quantity, and the relation, one might then wonder. (See also footnote 113.)
Of course, Dietrich is here anticipating challenges to his own reduction of these six accidents to the
category of relation, namely to what can be seen as relations happening extrinsically–a theoretical
move in which he was not alone (cf. footnote 90).
97The properties are B-entities that take their entitihood immediately from the quiddity of a
substance, reason why they are in a direct relation to it and cannot be conceived outside this
relation. These are in fact Type 1.1 B-entities, and the proper genus to be considered here is the
substance, even if taken under the genera quantity and quality. The example given above by Dietrich
is that of the one: This is originally taken from the number (substance), under whose notion it can
be considered from the viewpoint of (in)equality (as “one in quantity) or (dis)similarity (as “one in
quality”).
98These are the Type-1.2 B-entities, which are, or have the character of, properties. In effect, they
are in an A-entity but with relation to something else.
99This accounts for the fact that the (quasi-)properties constitute a distinct category.
100These are the Type 2 B-entities.
101Cf. footnote 97.
102The key word here is “nature” in the sense of essence. Although the Type-3 and Type-4 B-
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4 Dietrich’s Foundational Ontology
4.1 The Intellect as an Ontological Foundation
4.1.1 Ontological Intentionality
An important aspect to bear in mind when extracting a foundational ontology from
Dietrich’s causal ur-segregation of the Aristotelian categories (see Fig. 6) is that the
accidents are–wholly or in part–attributed to a mental act as their causal origin, more
specifically to the intentions, a term (re-)introduced in late medieval philosophy via
the Arab commentators of Aristotle (cf. Gyekye, 1971). In the first part of the De
origine, Dietrich had established a ur-distinction between natural and mental causes,
each associated respectively with natural and mental acts (cf. Fig. 7). The latter
are associated to two kinds of intention, first and second, the first intentions being
the concepts, or mental images/representations, of things, and the second intentions
being so to say concepts of concepts (e.g., grammatical categories such as noun, verb,
etc.). In any case, the term intentio, particularly so the prima intentio, conveys the
conception of mental representation as an act of the mind tending towards something
outside itself, a conception that was later on retaken and reintroduced in philosophy
by Brentano (1874/1995). Just as Dietrich uses the intentio to segregate causally
mental and natural entities, Brentano sees intentionality as that which distinguishes
mental and physical phenomena. Brentano’s passage on intentionality is rather well
known, but I quote it here again for the convenience of the reader:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the
Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object,
and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a
content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here
as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon
includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so
in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement
something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire
desired and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively
of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it.
We could, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are
those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves.
(Brentano, 1874/1995)
The difference between Brentano and Dietrich’s stances on the intentions is that the
latter sees them as not only the root for the distinction between mental and physical
phenomena or, in his terminology, between mental and natural acts or operations, but
also as having causal powers on the existence of some of the classes of entities that
compose reality, namely (some of) the Aristotelian accidents. So, we have here an
ontological cause that is in fact an epistemological principle: B’s formal subsistence
depends directly on A as a principle, or IN-cause that is also an OUT-cause for B, a
entities are related to some nature of a substance in terms of their own notion (cf. (34)), their genus
is that of the B-entities that more immediately determine the substance’s nature, i.e. the B-entities
of Types 1 and 2. This accounts for their being reduced to these B-entities.
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relation of direct or causal dependency that is actually “our conception of it,” or the
human cognitive ability.
This is, as I have argued for, epistemological idealism (Augusto, 2005; 2006a),
and a form of idealism that actually has its roots in Aristotle rather than directly
in Plato, namely inasmuch as the theory that the forms are in the human soul is to
be found directly in Aristotle’s De anima, even if it reaches the later middle ages
by very winding roads (Augusto, 2006b). But Dietrich was not an idealist isolated
among realists; the “school” of which he was a member, the Dominican scholastics,
shared many of his ideas, even if this group was not entirely homogeneous, and he
took medieval epistemological idealism to an unprecedented acumen.103 We can see
this as the semiotic triangle that acts as his ontological commitment in Figure 9,
where ontological categories are circumscribed to the Aristotelian ones.
Figure 9: Semiotic triangle for the De origine.
The surprising volte-face in the very beginning of part 2 of the De origine, (1)-
(6) is that what in part 1 had been segregated as having their formal subsistence
from a mental act alone (the Aristotelian accidents minus quality and quantity; see
Fig. 6) is now extended to all the entities that belong to another entity, including the
properties, and this is specified into four types that have to do with the substance–seen
as a subject–to which they belong (see below). This, then, is now the third kind of
entities, and this includes the properties, as well as the quantity and the qualities.
Importantly, they all take their formal subsistence from something else, so they all
can be captured by label B. In De origine I, we were told that this formal subsistence
is not attributable to a natural act, but rather to a mental operation, namely to a first
intention, so that Dietrich’s can be said to be an intentionality-based ontology.104 Of
course, it remains a causality-based ontology, but one in which intentionality plays a
103For instance, Dietrich’s ideas clashed in many important points against Thomas Aquinas’. In
particular, Aquinas’ strict distinction between the entities as conceived by the human mind (in
anima) and the entities as they are in the real world, i.e. outside the human mind (extra animam;
cf. In I Sent. d. II, q. 1, a. 3. comm.), appears unwarranted to Dietrich.
104I am here borrowing Brentano’s term; the usual caveats when using terms out of their historical
contexts apply. The fact that for Dietrich it is a first, and not a second, intention that has this causal
role is what I call in Augusto (2021) one of Dietrich’s “bombs.”
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central role.105
4.1.2 Cognition, Intellects, and Intentions in Late Medieval Philosophy
What exactly the theoretical reach of Dietrich’s ur-segregation between natural and
mental acts in terms of causality is needs thus to be investigated from the viewpoint
of this ontological intentionality–or less strongly put, intentionality-based ontology.
This, in turn, needs to be briefly contextualized.
In De origine I, the substances (the A-entities) were then postulated to be caused
by a natural act, while most B-entities–excepting here the properties and two of the
accidents, to wit, quality and quantity–were said to be caused by a mental act. If put
into relation with the Arabic doctrine of the intentions that was adopted and adapted
by the Dominican scholastics (Augusto, 2009; Gyekye, 1971), then Dietrich would be
expected to attribute to the entities caused by a mental act the ontological status of
second intentions, or things of reason, by an analogy with the universals, or second
substances, with respect to the first substances (see Fig. 10); but Dietrich sees them






















Figure 10: Aristotle’s two substances and the Arabic intentions.
This Arabic doctrine of the intentions roots directly in Aristotle’s distinction be-
tween first and second substances, as shown in Figure 10, where the symbol “I” de-
notes “corresponds to.” But this simple mapping between the first substances and the
first intentions and between the second substances and the second intentions comes
105In fact, Dietrich’s “intentionality” is a theory only remotely to be associated with Brentano’s,
namely in the sense that the former is a sort of ontological intentionality (rather than merely an
intentionality-based ontology), whereas the latter is simply a psychological theory of intentionality.
If Dietrich’s is indeed a theory of ontological intentionality, as I believe it is, this does not contradict
my opinion that it is (also) a stance in epistemological idealism: The strong version of this stance,
maximally exemplified in Berkeley’s motto esse est percipi (Berkeley, 1710; 1713), argues that (for
an entity) to be is to be perceived–or cognized, in today’s cognitive lingo. In particular, if the range
of mental acts actually includes the natural operations–an interrogation–, then we have it that the
whole of nature just is what the human mind says nature is, a strong epistemological idealist stance
concretized in the German Naturphilosophie (many sources, but see Pinkard, 2002).
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with a highly complex noetics–theory of the intellect (noûs, in Greek)–that ended up
causing trouble to many a Western philosopher in the 13th century.106 Briefly (but
see Augusto, 2009, for an elaboration), from an originally Aristotelian distinction be-
tween the agent and the possible intellects, which with Alexander of Aphrodisias had
already become a tripartition, the Arab philosophers had established a hierarchy of
at least five intellects. From lowest to highest, they conceived:
• The material intellect (intellectus materialis): The intellect in absolute potency,
capable–like first matter–of receiving all the forms.
• Intellect in habitu or in possible potency: This intellect, which has already
“received” the most basic principles of reasoning (e.g., “the whole is bigger than
the part”), is in act with respect to the material intellect.
• Intellect in act (intellectus in effectu) or in perfecting potency:
– Intellectus accommodatus: It both knows the intelligible forms and knows
that it knows.
– Intellectus adeptus: It thinks whatever it wants to without the effort of
acquiring the intelligible forms.
• Intellectus sanctus: It has an almost direct contact with the agent intellect.
• The agent intellect (intellectus agens): The “container” of all the intelligible
forms of everything.
This hierarchy is Avicenna’s, a highly influential commentator of Aristotle for the late
medieval Western philosophers (cf. Avicenna, sd/1968-1972). In Book III of De an-
ima, where Aristotle elaborates on his distinction between the agent and the possible
intellects, he makes it–arguably–clear that these are two “manners” or “modes” of the
human intellect when he states that “the soul (psychê) is all the beings.”107 However,
the strict separation between the agent intellect and the many other, lower, intellects
in the hierarchy above together with the Neoplatonic-influenced Arabic doctrine of
emanation motivated the belief that this was a separate intellect from which humans
would–via emanation–receive the intelligible forms. Then, some philosophers started
talking of the unity of the intellect in the sense that there was a single agent intellect,
a doctrine that was eventually attributed to Averroes, a commentator of Aristotle
even more influential than Avicenna.108 The question then rose: Who, then, thinks
in fact? A question with obvious issues that implicated the moral responsibility
of humans, and thus had also theological implications, calling for the intervention of
106This “trouble” is known now as the condemnations of the then bishop of Paris Étienne Tempier
in 1270 and 1277. These followed the–ineffective–condemnations of 1210 and 1215, also in Paris, in
which the teaching of both Aristotle’s natural philosophy (in 1210) and his physical and metaphysical
writings (1215), as well as the Arab commentaries thereon, were forbidden.
107Cf. De anima III, 8, 431b21 (Aristotle, sd/2016). For the controversial character of this inter-
pretation, see, e.g., Gerson (2004).
108So much so that he was known as the Commentator. As a matter of fact, Averroes appears
to have defended the thesis that there is a single, universal capacity for knowledge, out of which
individual thinking experiences are then made possible when individual humans face the particulars
of which reality is constituted.
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Thomas Aquinas, the utmost authority in theological issues in this period (cf. Thomas
Aquinas, sd/1968).
Albertus Magnus, who was at the head of the Western reception of this hierarchy,
had essentially adopted it but emphasizing the individual, human character of the
agent intellect (see Augusto, 2009).109 Partly following in his footsteps, Dietrich,
who was a disciple of Albertus Magnus, appears to revert to the original Aristotelian
distinction, disregarding any other of the intermediary intellects between the possible
and the agent intellects. And he leaves no room for doubt, when he states clearly that
this is our agent intellect he is talking about.110 While this is a subject worthy of
research by itself, here what is relevant is that Dietrich of Freiberg appears to want to
retain Aristotle’s original doctrine of the human soul as both the container of all the
intelligible forms and their actualization when confronted with the particulars, but for
reasons that go beyond a mere account of human cognition in the strict sense. The
strictly cognitive operation of the human intellect is as follows: The agent intellect
contributes with the intelligible forms that it possesses in itself, what Dietrich sees
as its “universal and exceedingly formal faculty” (cf. De origine II, 15); the possible
intellect, thus coined because it is the potency to become–the representation of–any
entity in act, then becomes actualized by the form or the quiddity of every entity.111
This is by and large Aristotle’s own doctrine, but the difference between the latter
and Dietrich’s is that this sees this cooperation as an ontological causal origin; in
effect, Dietrich sees the human intellect, taken as a cooperative duo constituted by
the agent and the possible intellects, as possessing the ability to “bring out”–elicere,
in Latin–(some) entities and to actualize in them their entitihood (agit entitatem in
eis; cf. ibid.). In the specific case at hand of the categories other than the substance,
Dietrich attributes this intellectual causality specifically to a first intention, thus going
against the then current view that the accidents were things of second intention, or
mere beings of reason, entia rationis, with a lesser ontological status–a view that,
however, had already started to change with Ockham’s semantic perspective (see
Klima, 1993).
4.2 Four Types of Subjecthood: A Subjective Foundational
Ontology
Dietrich’s elaboration on the Aristotelian categories goes as far as it can go: It reduces
the Aristotelian list to a single category, the substance, namely insofar as this is taken
as a thing of first intention (see Fig. 10). This is what I call Dietrich’s “third bomb.”
This implicit reduction is carried out by what he calls analogies (first and second), and
is itself supported by an explicit inter-categorial reduction: Of the nine Aristotelian
accidents, only two remain as true independent categories, to wit, the quantity and
the quality, with the relation and the remaining six accidents being given a derivative
ontological status.
109At the request of Pope Alexander IV, Albertus Magnus wrote in 1256 a treatise in which he
exposed the Arabian theses of the unicity of the intellect and weighed them against his own ones.
Relevant in this commissioned “pamphlet” is that Albertus Magnus “sanitizes” Averroes’ role in the
creation and diffusion of this then for many unpalatable doctrine.
110Intellectus igitur noster agens... (De origine II, 15).
111Representation is a concept that is typically avoided in studies in both classical and medieval
noetics, a state of affairs I strongly disagree with; see Augusto (2006b).
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But Dietrich remains faithful to the Aristotelian theory in many points, in par-
ticular in what of it roots in the notion of subject. This is so much so that the
causal-dependency focus falls now largely on the substance as subject for the remain-
ing entities, and on these as entia entis, or entities that belong to an entity. This
belonging is the crux of any ontology rooting in Aristotle’s categories, because, as
seen above, this appears to be more of a linguistic, or in any case language-use, as-
pect than an ontological one. In De origine II, 7, Dietrich clarifies the sense in which
the B-entities, which he refers to as entities of the third kind, are to be distinguished
from attributes of a subject such as a diet, which can be said to be healthy with
respect to the health of an animal (the final cause), or a herb, which can be said to
be medicinal by attribution to the art of medicine (the efficient cause): A diet cannot
be said to be healthy unless we have in mind an end for a subject (the subject can be
healthy if following a certain diet); equally, a herb has not in itself and in terms of its
essence any medicinal powers unless we consider the art of medicine with respect to
a subject (the subject can be healed if drinking a herbal infusion). But the entities
that are here under scrutiny are attributed to a subject “in themselves and in terms
of their essence,” which already gives the B-entities, if not the same, a very similar
ontological status with respect to the substances, or A-entities.
In any case, for Dietrich a B-entity depends causally on an A-entity’s subjecthood
for its own formal subsistence, and it is the latter’s type of subjecthood, rather than its
substancehhod, that has now the central role in ontological causality. The question
to answer then in the analysis of De origine II is how Dietrich (i) conciliates this
subjecthood-based causality with the three different causes conceived by him in De
origine I, to recall, the IN-causes, corresponding to Aristotle’s formal and material
causes, the OUT-causes, corresponding to Aristotle’s final and efficient causes, and
the OUTIN-causes, or extrinsic principles, and (ii) does so from the viewpoint of what
I above (Section 4.1) called ontological intentionality.
4.2.1 The Substance as Subject: Substancehood and Subjecthood
If we think of an individual man, say John Doe, we necessarily think of him according
to whatever can be attributed to him (e.g., height, hair color, job, ...); if nothing is
attributable to John Doe, then there is only his being a substance, which amounts to
John Doe’s being an individual man (a first substance); this means that John Doe is
a human, a member of a species, and hence an animal (the genus) (cf. Fig. 4)–and
a rational one for that matter (the differentia). This is the same as saying that John
Doe exists at a purely formal level, where all we can say about him is that he is a
material substance, viz. an animate sensitive body, viz. an animal, and a rational one,
and thus a human (cf. Porphyry’s tree). This is John Doe’s quiddity, his definitio or
entitas, in the jargon of medieval ontology. The important aspect to draw from this
is that, though of course we cannot really say much about John Doe, we have what it
takes to be able to say something specific about him as soon as we start considering
with respect to him, taken as a substance, the things that happen to him, i.e. the
accidents. In other words, the substance is what remains–i.e., what is essential–when
all the accidents are removed. This is a rough outline of the distinction between
essentiality and accidentality in Aristotelian metaphysics.
As seen above (see Section 2.3), Aristotle associates with substance a notion of
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subject and of what it is to say something of a substance as subject. In particular, he
writes: “Whenever something is said of another thing as of a subject, everything that
is said of the predicated thing will also be said of the subject” (Categories, 1b 10).
And he gives the following example: “Man” is predicated of the individual man (the
subject), and in turn “animal” is predicated of man (the subject), so that “animal”
is predicated also of the individual man. So far, the linguistic use at play is obvious;
things start to complicate when Aristotle adds that this is so because the individual
man is indeed both a man and an animal (ibid.). It thus appears that Aristotle is
defending the stance that our logical constructs as based on, or just expressed in, our
natural language veridically reflect the ontological status of things, which, in turn,
suggests a philosophical stance of metaphysical realism.
But we know that Dietrich’s stance was epistemological idealism; we also know
that both Aristotle and his commentators were authoritative sources for him. So, it
will be interesting to see how Dietrich conciliates both aspects. Just like Aristotle,
Dietrich accepts the privileged ontological status of the substance. In effect, it appears
to be his very ur-element, to which all the other entities, to wit, the properties and
the accidents–belong. But the very beginning of De origine II introduces new aspects,
some of which appear to be at odds with the contents of De origine I with respect to
the entities that belong to other entities: Dietrich now considers all the entities that
belong to another entity–the properties and the nine accidents (contrast this with
Fig.s 6 and 8)–from the viewpoint of the substance as subject, but in a much more
complex way than Aristotle’s. The next paragraphs clarify this statement.
Dietrich’s general definition of substance was given in De origine I, 23 (see Section
3.1). More specifically now, for Dietrich an A-entity is a substance in two senses:
The first sense is that of subsistence (we say simply “A is a substance”); the second
is better conveyed by the Latin verb substare, lie/be under (we say “A is a substance
for B”). We can see this as the different senses of substancehood, that which makes
an entity be a substance as such. In the latter conception, A acts as a subject for
B, which, if we take the original Greek and Latin senses of this word,112 means that
A lies, or is, under B. But in the former notion A can also, by simply subsisting,
act as a subject for any B. Thus, substancehood, in turn, determines different types
of subjecthood–the property of being a subject. This is in fact the central concept to
grasp what Dietrich’s foundational ontology is all about; in effect, if we retake the
citation from paragraph (25) of De origine I annotated above in Section 3.1 and now
further annotate it with this concept, we have the key to Dietrich causality-based
ontology:
This way is that in which something [Subjecthood] is a principle [an IN-
cause] for another [B] in such a way that by virtue of this very principle
existing outside the essence [an OUT-cause] of that whose [B’s] principle
it is, by virtue of that same principle does it [B], whose principle it is,
nevertheless subsist formally, inasmuch as it [B] takes from that same
existing principle the notion of its [B’s] entitihood or quiddity from our
conception of it [Subjecthood].
So, subjecthood, as a human concept with relation to substance, is the link between
112Respectively, hypokéımenon, present participle neutral of hypokéımenein, and subiectum, present
participle neutral of subiecere.
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Dietrich’s ontology and noetics, in the sense that the human mind is endowed with
ontological causal powers–an endowment that coincides with first intentions (see Sec-
tion 4.1 above). In his analysis of the causal origin of the accidents and of the entities
that have the manner of accidents (the properties), all called here B-entities for the
sake of clarity, Dietrich distinguishes four types of causal dependency, which are ac-
tually ordered in degree depending on A’s subjecthood, or how A is conceived to act
as a subject with relation to B (cf. De origine II, 1). Briefly, an entity B depends
causally on another entity A, a substance (in principle), according to the latter’s:
Subjecthood−, i.e. according to A’s formal and definitive notion, or quiddity, rather
than A’s subjecthood (Type 1);
Subjecthood0, i.e. A’s being a subject for B (Type 2);
Subjecthood+, i.e. A’s subjecthood0 and something else (C) in A as a subject
(Type 3);
Subjecthood++, i.e. A’s subjecthood+ plus something (C) that is in another sub-
ject (D) (Type 4).
This is thus a distinction ordered in degree from “−” through “++.” The proliferation
of entities in Types 3-4, in which things C and D are also considered in a substance
taken as a subject, is noteworthy. As a matter of fact, Types 3-4 are originated from
Types 1-2, we are told in paragraph (33), so that they can be seen as subtypes in
what is in fact a phased operation
{{Type 4}⇒ {Type 3}}⇒ {Type 1, Type 2}
where the symbol “⇒” denotes reduction in the sense of the arrows. This reduction
entails the fact that the Type-3 and Type-4 B-entities do not have an own genus of
























Figure 11: Dietrich’s causal ur-partition of entities (B) that belong to another entity (A) by
the latter’s notion of subjecthood: A first sketch.
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Figure 11 schematizes the state of things in the beginning of the De origine II
as far as the causal dependency of the B-entities with respect to A is concerned.
The crucial aspect in this causal ur-partition is that Dietrich displaces the focus from
the causes themselves to the substances taken as subjects for the accidents and the
properties. It is easy to see from this figure that subjecthood has a central ontological
status in Dietrich’s foundational ontology, a superior status that is conveyed by the
fact that “A causes B”–denoted by A=⇒B–appears now to be equivalent to, or in
any case on the same ontological level as, “B belongs to A.” But the reader should
be warned that soon enough (see next Sections) Dietrich will consider that accidents
can also be considered A-entities.
4.2.2 Properties
Type-1 subjecthood, or Subjecthood−, with respect to an A-entity corresponds to
the B-entities that Dietrich calls properties, a topic he elaborates on in paragraphs
(8) through (17). The central aspect with respect to these B-entities is that they are
not accidents proper, except if we consider A, the entity to which they belong, as a
subject and its formal notion as a cause. In effect, in De origine I, they were seen as
having solely IN-causes, namely the form of the A-entities to which they belong (cf.
Fig. 8). This accounts for my specifying A’s subjecthood as Subjecthood−, where
the superscript “–” denotes a diminished (in any case: minimal) form of subjecthood.
But, as a matter of fact, these B-entities are divided into two subtypes, according to
the following specification:
Type 1.1: These B-entities are in an A-entity in terms of its essence in itself and
absolutely, and they may entail a deprivation in A if removed or absent. The
one and the many, which take their entitihood from the number, are here the
first kinds; then, the other B-entities of this type take their entitihood from the
subject genus: a number can be even or odd, the equal and the unequal are
taken from the one in quantity, and the similar and the dissimilar take their
quiddity from the one in quality.
Type 1.2: These B-entities are in an A-entity in terms of the latter’s essence but with
relation to something else. E.g., the cause and the caused; the active potency
and the passive potency.
The main difference between Types 1.1 and 1.2 is that the former B-entities take their
entitihood from the subject–for instance, even and odd take their entitihood from the
number–, whereas the latter B-entities take their entitihood from the formal notion of
the subject but with respect to something else. This difference is ontologically relevant
in the sense that Type 1.2 specifies B-entities whose presence in an A-entity entails
something positively in it, reason why Dietrich sees them as not being, but having the
manner of, properties, whose absence may entail a deprivation in A. To make this
distinction clearer, I propose we reserve the term properties for the B-entities of Type
1.1 and call those of Type 1.2 quasi-properties.
An important aspect is that in De origine I the properties were attributed solely
to the simple essences, whereas now they appear to be attributed to natural entities
without taking into consideration the ur-segregation of these entities into intelligible
and sensible entities (see Fig. 8). Indeed, they are said to take their entitihood and
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their quiddity from A-entities considered in terms of quantity and quality (see Type
1.1 above), which in De origine I were attributed to the sensible entities alone. Be it
as it may–an important issue that cannot be discussed here–, they are said to have
their causal origin solely in the human intellect. This is firstly said with respect to
the Type-1.2 entities (cf. De origine II, 10), but in fact Dietrich generalizes this
to all the Type-1 entities. Dietrich argues for an exclusive mental causality of the
(quasi-)properties by appealing to (i) the final cause, (ii) the formal cause, and (iii)
their proper character and nature: These B-entities are not the principle of a natural
operation (i), they are not natural determinations of an A-entity (ii), and they are
either a deprivation (a non-entity) or something positive for an A-entity, but their
presence does not entail any natural transmutation–in fact, A may simply not exist
at all, being a mere figment of human imagination (iii).
This is elaborated on in De origine II, 11-13; in ibid., 14, Dietrich concludes
that the “principle and cause”–i.e., both IN- and OUT-causes–of these Type-1.2 B-
entities are to be attributed to the intellect effectively, to the substance or the essence
of an A-thing subjectively, and to the notion (ratio) of an A-thing originally and
informationally, where by “effectively” the efficient cause is meant, by “subjectively”
Dietrich refers to an A-entity taken as subject, and by“originally and informationally”
he conveys the fact that the notion or definition of an A-entity both gives origin to a
B-entity and distinguishes it formally from non-being by in-forming it, or providing
it with form.
So, it appears that Dietrich distinguishes here three causes for the B-entities of
Type 1, to wit, the intellect, A’s subjecthood, and A’s notion. But, in fact, the
two last ones are eliminated as causal origins of these B-entities for the reason that
nature cannot distinguish between the thing-subject (res subiecta) and the notion of
the thing-subject. As there are only two ur-causes, nature or the intellect, causality
with respect to these Type-1 B-entities falls on the intellect. But, and importantly,
if nature cannot distinguish between the thing-subject and the notion of the thing-
subject, then subjecthood is a matter of the human intellect and it may be concluded
that the A-entities of this Type 1 also have their causal origin in it, at least as
far as their subjecthood is concerned (cf. Fig. 12). Figure 12 schematizes Dietrich’s
elaboration on the Type-1 B-entities. Note in this diagram the bidirectional character
of causality, a crucial feature denoted by “⇐⇒”.
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Figure 12: Type-1 entities and causality for Dietrich of Freiberg.
In De origine II, 15, Dietrich clarifies this intellectual causality by appealing to
the Aristotelian distinction between the agent and the possible intellects (cf. Section
4.1.2), and ends up stating that it is a first intention that is at play in this causal-
ontological relationship between both the A- and the B-entities of Type 1. On the
other hand, this means that the categorial status of properties is logically indetermi-
nate: They do not constitute a categorial genus, having an incomplete entitihood and
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being solely properties of the ten categories. This logical status is related to a lesser
ontological status, but if they are taken from an entity that is a natural determination
of a thing, i.e. a quantity or a quality, then they have the full status of an entity, and
hence constitute a categorial genus.113
4.2.3 Inherents and Adherents
Dietrich discusses the B-entities of Type 2 in paragraphs (18) through (32) of De
origine II. They are specified according to the subjecthood of the corresponding A-
entities, to wit, Subjecthood0, where the superscript “0” is meant to denote the most
basic full notion of subjecthood. These A-entities, we are straightaway told, are sub-
stances, and these B-entities, which are among the nine accidents, entail some natural
thing with respect to them. Although we are told that the qualities and the quanti-
ties are here prominent, things are more complicated than the simple identification
of these two accidents with the B-entities of Type 2.
In effect, Subjecthood0 comes in a twofold way that is related to the twofold
distinction of substancehood discussed briefly above in Section 4.2.1 in the following
way (cf. De origine II, 19):
Type 2.1: An A-entity acts as a subject for a B-entity that formally inheres to it,
so that a single entity is constituted as from a subject (A) and a form (B).
Type 2.2: an A-entity, in subsisting, sustains some nature or determination (a B-
entity) adhering to itself.
I thus call these B-entities respectively inherents and adherents. Their relation to
substancehood is as follows (cf. De origine II, 19-20): Type 2.1 has to do with
substancehood in the sense of substanding (to some form), whereas subsisting is the
notion of substancehood in Type 2.2. This distinction affects the B-entities in that
they merely in-exist formally to a natural thing in the first case; they exist simpliciter
in the second case inasmuch as they are natural determinations of a substance that,
by subsisting in itself and essentially, is in an exceedingly formal way. Dietrich sum-
marizes this distinction by saying that the B-entities of Type 2.1 inhere to a natural
thing, whereas those of Type 2.2 adhere to it, the ontological difference being that in
the first case the B-entities constitute a single entity with the A-entity to which they
belong, but remain separate from the essence of the A-entity in the second. Interest-
ingly, this means that the subject in Type 2.1 is in fact also something else besides
being a support or substratum to the B-entities that in-exist formally to it, whereas
the subject in Type 2.2 is wholly determined in its natural operations or changes by
the B-entities, which work thus as its natural determinations (dispositiones naturales)
as a substance.
Dietrich focuses largely on the adherents, which are accidents proper because they
happen to the subject (the A-entity) as determinations, and because this is in fact
their essence they can be considered substances by analogy and in a specific order of
consideration (ibid., 23-24):
113We had already been indirectly told about this in De origine II, 9: Some properties are taken
from the one in either quantity (e.g., equal and unequal) or quality (e.g., similar and dissimilar).
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(I) First, an entity that has an OUT-cause is constituted in being by its
OUT-causes;
(II) its formal entitihood is then considered in it in terms of the quiddity and
of the form (so, IN-causes);
(III) its natural property inasmuch as it is an entity is considered as a derivation
from this formal notion.
The keywords here are “determination” and “natural property”: In effect, Dietrich
sees Subjecthood0 as associated here with a natural cause, as these B-entities happen
in a subject (fiunt in subiecto; the efficient cause) in relation to some end (the final
cause) (ibid., 22). Retaking the distinction in Subjecthood0 with respect to the two
abovementioned different conceptions of substancehood (in ibid., 26-28), Dietrich then
sees the B-entities of Type 2.1, or the inherents, as accidents proper and clearly
distinct from the substance (the A-entity), and those of Type 2.2 as being even more
formal than the substances if that which they are accidentally is considered, and
as entailing in the substances certain natures that are “principles” of their natural
operations or changes.
Although all the Aristotelian accidents firstly appear to be considered in Type 2.2,
in fact this type is constituted only by the qualities and the quantities, which are now
distinguished by the fact that the former are “principles” of such natural operations
or changes both essentially and primarily, whereas the latter are so essentially but
not primarily (cf. ibid., 28-30). (“Principles,” here, should be taken as denoting both
IN- and OUT-causes.) This done, Dietrich raises the issue of the possible confusion
of Types 1 and 2.2, but quickly dismisses it in paragraph (32) by appealing to two
different reasons for which a B-entity takes its entitihood from an A-entity, to wit, by
virtue of the notion of its quiddity from its formal notion as in an eliciting way (quasi
elicitive) and according to its specific notion as in a subjective way (quasi subiective);
in the former, human reason, which distinguishes between a subject or a thing and
its formal notion, brings out (elicit) the B-entities and actualizes their entitihood,
whereas in the latter it is nature, which does not have the distinguishing abilities of
human reason, that determines different formal natures of determinate species with
respect to different things solely according to itself, rather than from their specific
nature or formal notion. These are respectively Types 1 and 2.2.
Summing up, by the end of the discussion of Type-2 entities we known that Di-
etrich considers the qualities and the quantities as the B-entities of Type 2.2, which
belong to an A-entity that subsists by itself; they adhere to A, and for this reason
I call them adherents. These B-entities are accidents, but they can also be seen as
substances themselves. The B-entities of Type 2.1 are also–and solely–accidents but
they belong to an A-entity that is seen as substanding with respect to them and
with relation to which they inhere, reason why I call them inherents; we are not told
exactly which of the Aristotelian accidents they might be. This distinction with re-
spect to the notion of Subjecthood0 entails, however, no distinction in causality: Both
Types 2.1 and 2.2 appear to be originated exclusively from a natural act or operation.
Figure 13, in which the bidirectionality of causality should be noted, summarizes the
elaboration in De origine II, 18-32.
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Figure 13: Type-2 entities and causality for Dietrich of Freiberg.
4.2.4 Relations
In De origine II, 34-54, Dietrich approaches the Type-3 B-entities, which are by and
large–but not wholly–identified with the (Aristotelian) relations.114 Figure 14 shows
the general diagram for these entities whose causal origin was attributed to OUTIN-
causes in De origine I (cf. Fig.s 6 and 8 above), an aspect that is at this stage however
left open and indicated by means of an interrogation mark.
If we consider the entitihood of a B-entity as originating formally and in terms of
subject from an A-entity as according to Subjecthood+, then we consider some other
entity (C) in A. We had already been told this, but now–in paragraph (34)–Dietrich
introduces a key concept for these entities: They take their entitihood from an A-
entity in a completing way. Also important is the fact that, contrarily to Type-2
B-entities, they do not entail any nature or any real determination in A taken as a
substance proper, but their own notion entails some nature in A that it is necessary
to consider.






Figure 14: Type-3 entities and causality for Dietrich of Freiberg: A preliminary diagram.
Having been informed of this, we are told–in (35)–that not all the relative de-
terminations are relations in the categorial sense here considered; more specifically,
relations solely according to reason, or logical relations, are not to be taken in the
categorial sense. This is the case when either the A-entity is a subject only accord-
114See Section 2.3 above.
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ing to reason, or the correlatives are distinct solely according to reason, as when the
same thing is related to itself under the same relation.115 Although we are not given
concrete examples, it is obvious that Dietrich is excluding reason alone as the causal
origin of the B-entities of Type 3. On the other hand, real relations are excluded from
this type if the B-entities are related by their own essence and not by some nature
in the subject: They are in fact not relations, being rather properties, i.e. Type-1
B-entities.
Dietrich then analyzes the relations in the context of Aristotle’s Book V of the
Metaphysics, in which relation is distinguished according to whether the correlatives
do not necessarily belong to the same genus (Type A of relation) or do belong to the
same genus (Type B); these two types are further subdivided according to whether
the correlatives are relatives by themselves or one of them is a relative by itself and
the other one is so accidentally. Table 1 summarizes this Aristotelian distinction as
seen by Dietrich and provides the examples of each subtype given by him. Subtype
A.1 had already been given as an example of a quasi-property (cf. (10)), and subtype
B.1 comprises examples of both properties and quasi-properties (cf. (9)-(10)), which
might lead us to conclude that the relations that are reduced to Type-1 B-entities are
those in which the correlatives are relatives by themselves or essentially.
Table 1: Aristotelian relation according to Dietrich of Freiberg.
RELATION
A. correlatives not
necessarily belonging to the
same genus




































But relations are more complicated than this, in particular when one tries to distin-
guish relations by reason vs. in reality and their implications in the manner–essentially
or accidentally–in which the correlatives take part in them, it being the case that
accidentality appears to be associated with reason alone. In paragraph (39), Diet-
rich begins a short theological “aside” on this topic that in fact aims at confronting
Thomas Aquinas, for whom the accidental relation between God and the creatures–to
use causal theological jargon–is solely intellectual, or by reason alone, namely because
God is not a part of the created reality. Dietrich argues that if one correlative E is
related in reality to another correlative F, then so is F related to E, whether acci-
dentally or essentially so, i.e. both correlatives belong to the same class, because in
115This is what today is called a reflexive relation in mathematical jargon.
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fact “the notion of that which is accidentally consists in a certain analogy with that
which is essentially” (De origine II, 41).
It is hard to say what exactly is at play in this short theological “aside” that takes
only paragraphs (39) and (40), because the notion of relation was heavily implicated
in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity,116 but from the viewpoint of the ontological
categories it appears that Dietrich reiterates the theory that the accidents, if consid-
ered by analogy, are also substances, so that the former have no “lesser” ontological
status with respect to the latter. This, in turn, might be a “maneuver” to put reason
as a causal origin on the same ontological footing with the natural causes. In effect,
in paragraph (41) he implicitly targets Thomas Aquinas, for whom there is a clear
distinction between the entities as conceived by the human mind (in anima) and in
the real world, or outside the human mind (extra animam); and the categories, in par-
ticular the accidents, were seen typically as mere beings of reasons, or things of second
intention with a fundamentum, or foundation, in reality (in re), like the universals
(genus, species, etc.) and even other (logical) constructs such as propositions and syl-
logisms. The notion of fundamentum was particularly problematic in the framework
of the relations, as here they are taken as that which a subject of a relation is besides
being a subject to the relation, i.e. that which it is substantially. In this context, for
instance, and explaining Dietrich’s explicit invocation of Augustine in paragraph (40),
the Christian God was seen to remain as a fundamentum in the trinitary relation and
hence not affected–i.e. changed–by being a subject to the different “persons” in the
Trinity.
And, indeed, the notion of fundamentum is soon enough going to feature profusely
in Dietrich’s elaboration. Resuming his discussion of the relations in paragraph (42),
Dietrich throws new light on his conception of the Type-3 B-entities when he char-
acterizes them as “forms with an intrinsic origin,” meaning by this that they do not
take their own entitihood from the relation in which they are with respect to A and,
in this, C. So, the conclusion follows: The relations are in fact either properties of
something natural, i.e. Type-1 B-entities, as summarily defended in (44), or they are
real qualities and quantities (Type-2(.2) B-entities),117 inasmuch as they are brought
out according to something’s form and definitive reason, it being the case that this
“something” is in fact a natural determination (a C-entity) of a substance (A), as
elaborated more at length in (45)-(46). In paragraph (47), Dietrich summarizes the
reduction of the relations to, on the one hand, the B-entities of Type 1, and, on
the other hand, the B-entities of Type 2(.2), by invoking the one as both a natural
property of a substance (i.e. when the C-entities in A are not considered) and taken
in terms of continuous quantity–a C-entity–with respect to a physical substance (A),
respectively.
This done, Dietrich starts a short elaboration that appears to aim at establishing
that the accidents are in fact things of first intention. The “trick” is to consider them
by a double analogy with the substance, and this with respect to Subjecthood+: In
this, we know that a B-entity is originated not directly from the A-entity, which is a
116See, e.g., Thom (2011) for a brief introduction with references to sources.
117This roots partly in Aristotle’s Categories, namely in the fact that for him what is distinctive of
quantity is that two entities can be equal or unequal with respect to each other as far as quantity
is concerned, and the same reasoning applies to quality if similarity and dissimilarity are considered
(Cat., 6a26 and 11a15, respectively), but, equal and unequal are relatives (cf. B.1-relatives in Table
1), and the same holds for similar and dissimilar.
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real entity, but from (the formal notion of) a C-entity that is in A as an accident or
as a natural determination (the second analogy). Just as in the same way that this
C-entity is a natural entity by a first analogy, though a remoter one with respect to
the substance (A), a Type-3 B-entity can be said also to be a natural entity.118
This abstruse explanation can become clearer if we invoke Aristotle’s division of
the substance into first and second (see Fig. 4 above): The genus (e.g., animal)
and the species (e.g., man, horse) are the formal notions of a first substance (e.g.,
and respectively, the individual man and the individual horse), so that by analogy
they are substances, too, even if perhaps in a “remoter” way with respect to the first
substance. It so happened that the second substances were seen as things of second
intention, or mere beings of reason (see Fig. 10), but Dietrich seems to want to reject
this received interpretation of the Arabic doctrine of the intentions, and he does so in
De origine II, (49)-(53), by appealing to the notion of foundation and by analyzing
the way terms are used in philosophical discourse, a much used Scholastic method.
According to Dietrich, it can indeed be said that the reality of the relations is but
the reality of their foundation, as held by, for instance, Henry of Ghent and Richard of
Middleton, but one has to focus on the meaning of the terms “thing” (res) or “reality”
(realitas) both taken as a countable noun and as interchangeable: If by these one
means some nature or some natural determination, then the reality of these entities is
but the reality of their foundation, or the substance they belong to, namely because
accidents are substances by analogy, as seen above, and if by these terms one means
“whatever in whatsoever manner is according to the notion of whatsoever formal act,
thanks to which notion it is a thing of first intention” (ibid., 51), then again the reality
of the accidents as categories, or real accidents, and that of the substance from which
they take their entitihood is the same; in both cases, and thanks to the notion of
foundation or fundamentum, they have their causal origin in a natural act. But if
one focuses on the formal meaning of these terms, by means of which an entity firstly
differs from non-being or nothingness, then their cause is an intellectual operation,
because only the intellect can distinguish between a thing and its notion, from which
it brings out or produces the very thing itself. This shows that the likes of Henry of
Ghent are not entirely correct; indeed, they are considering the accidents as categorial
entities according to the sole designation.
Figure 15 shows diagramatically the end result of Dietrich’s elaboration on the
relations as Type-3 B-entities that reduces them to both the Type-1 B-entities and
the Type-2(.2) B-entities (quantities and qualities). Importantly, nature as a causal
origin is entirely eliminated from this causal-based schema, leaving the intellect alone,
namely the first intention, as causal origin of the relations. (Compare Fig. 10 with
Fig. 13.) One might thus wonder whether this quite long and tortuous elaboration
aimed at the removal of nature as a cause, rather than at the reduction proper of the
relations to B-entities of Types 1 and 2.
As shown in Figure 15, we still do not know whether the relations are also reducible
to Type-2.1 B-entities, which, in turn, are also not yet clearly identified.
118See Section 4.2.3 for the first analogy. In this, the Type-2 B-entities are taken as natural entities,
because they have their causal origin in nature (cf. Fig. 13). Even if they are “remoter” natural
entities in the sense that they are accidents or natural determinations of a natural entity that is a
true entity (an A-entity), by the first analogy with these substances they are also substances.
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Figure 15: Type-3 entities, causality, and reduction for Dietrich of Freiberg: A provisional
diagram.
4.2.5 The Remaining Aristotelian Accidents–And the Relations, Again
In what remains of De origine II, Dietrich addresses the B-entities of Type 4, char-
acterized in terms of subject by Subjecthood++, in which the double “+” denotes an
additional entity to be considered as compared to Subjecthood+. This is evident in
Dietrich’s own definition, which I annotate for the sake of analysis. This is the type
in which
there is an entity [B] because it belongs to an entity [A] in terms of
subject, but according to something else [C] that is considered in that
same subject, and originally from the notion of another entity [D] that is
different from the subject. (De origine II, 55)
Dietrich illustrates this definition by appealing to place as a category: Place, the B-
entity under consideration, belongs to a corporeal substance (the A-entity) in terms
of subject thanks to its (A’s) dimensions (the C-entity); but before anything else the
B-entity is in A in terms of the containing place (the D-entity), which is different
from the subject (A). Importantly, the dimensions are by nature prior to the very
substance, the same being said about the containing space that so to say delimits the
substance as a body, and thus these B-entities have natural causes in their origin;
but their formality is attained by the relation (a Type-3 B-entity) they have to the
subject to which they inhere (a Type 2.1 B-entity; cf. Fig. 13). So, we have here a
reduction of the Type-4 B-entities firstly to the Type-3 B-entities and secondly to the
Type-2.1 B-entities, and we can delete the interrogation marks in Figure 13 above.
Figure 16 shows the reduction of the six accidents that are the Type-4 B-entities to
relations that in turn are reducible to Type-2.1 B-entities.
But this takes us to yet another revision: There are in fact two subtypes of re-
lations, to wit, those that are reducible to properties (Type-1 B-entities) and to the
Type 2.2 B-entities, constituted by the adherents (qualities and quantities), and those
that are so to the so to Type 2.1 B-entities, or the inherents.119 Figure 17 shows this
subdivision of the relations for Dietrich. Because we had already been told that the
119This is my interpretation, which makes me translate “insunt” as “inhere” in these paragraphs.
This interpretation is accounted for the fact that without this reduction, the set of inherents–Type-
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Figure 16: Type-4 entities and causality for Dietrich of Freiberg.
causal origin of the relations is to be found in the intellect, namely as a first intention,















(Type 2.1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
Figure 17: Type-3 entities and causality for Dietrich of Freiberg.
As said above, these reductions entail the fact that the B-entities of Types 3 and
4 do not constitute a proper genus of category, or are not fully categories. Dietrich
ends the text of De origine II precisely with an account of this aspect that is likely
to attract criticism (cf. paragraphs (59)-(62)).
5 Summing Up and Some Final Considerations
Dietrich’s foundational ontology as extracted from the analysis above of De origine
I-II is shown in Figure 18. A central feature of this ontology is that it is based on Aris-
2.1 B-entities–would simply be left as an empty set, which does not agree with Dietrich’s short
elaboration thereon in paragraph (19); moreover, in paragraph (20) Dietrich uses “insunt” to char-
acterize these B-entities. Additionally, in De origine I, 28, Dietrich anticipates this reduction when
he writes (my italics): “According to this notion of inhering, out of such a form and a subject an
entity is created accidentally, or relatively, whose principle, in that it is such an entity, is not only
the subject but in fact the inhering form, precisely rather the very form, as it is in terms of the
act the principle of such an entity.” This distinguishes the inherents from the adherents (Type-2.2
B-entities), which are consistently characterized as being natural determinations of an A-entity.
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Figure 18: Dietrich’s foundational ontology as extracted from De origine I-II. (“S” abbre-
viates “Subjecthood”, and the symbol “⇒” denotes reduction, namely in the sense of the
arrows. The symbol “.” denotes an ontological association that is not a reduction.)
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totle’s theory of the categories, which was elaborated on mainly in his Categories and
Metaphysics, with a few bits in his Topics; hence, we can say that this is a revisionary
foundational ontology if seen from today’s ontology-engineering perspective. As R.
Pinzani (2021) puts it in a commentary on Augusto (2021), “Aristotle’s categories
ultimately have limited or no utility, even understood as a system of grammatical
classification.” That much is true, the importance of Aristotle’s theory of categories
is not to be found on these ontological constructs per se; rather, it is the fact that
Aristotle firstly saw it as the task of the philosopher to produce an inventory, both
exhaustive and exclusive, of what (there) is that is of import–now also outside the
restricted circle of philosophers.
Dietrich of Freiberg is a good example of the philosopher taking over this task:
He did not simply adopt a theory he clearly saw as authoritative; he adapted it, and
he did so in unexpected ways. To begin with, he (i) introduced a new category, to
wit, the (quasi-)properties, so that his starting point is an extension of Aristotle’s
theory (see Fig. 19); additionally, he (ii) carried out a partition of the Aristotelian
categories based on an original interpretation of subjecthood, and (iii) proceeded to
consider inter-reductions between these subsets of categories. Besides these, Dietrich
also considered a special ontological association between the (quasi-)properties and
the adherents (and inherents?) that is not a reduction, even if he speaks of the former
considered as adherents in some cases.
As seen above, this reductionism in the context of the Aristotelian categories was
not new, some influential medieval philosophers having attempted to reduce them in
number, but Dietrich went as far as he could in his reductionism: All the entities are
substances, whether per se or by analogy; any entity either is in itself, or is in–or
belongs to–another entity by analogy with which it is also per se or in itself. Thus,
what we have here is a reductionist foundational ontology in the literal sense of the
term. In effect, the ontological status of all the “entities that belong to an entity” is
such that they end up being simply reduced to the very substances they are said to
belong to via two analogies, first and second. In other words, all the accidents, or
entities that are in substances either by adherence or inherence, and the properties
are subsets of substance. These two aspects, revisionism and reductionism, agree
with ontological commitments in late medieval philosophy taken in a very general
perspective (see Augusto, 2021).
P∗ (Categories)Dietrich = {substance} ∪Accidents︸ ︷︷ ︸
P(Categories)Aristotle
∪ Properties
Figure 19: Dietrich’s categorial ur-partition in De origine II.
But, in fact, Dietrich had something in the sleeve prepared to be exhibited only in
De origine II: If substance is all there is, namely first substances or particulars, then
all there is has its causal origin in the human mind, namely as a first intention, because
substancehood is tightly connected to our own conception of subjecthood. Thus, in
fact his can (also) be seen as a descriptive foundational ontology, particularly so when
we are left undecided whether the substances, too, are not also a product of the human
mind.
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This, however, would require the elimination of nature as a causal origin with
respect to the Type-2.2 B-entities, or adherents, which have consistently been causally
attributed to nature, or to OUT- and IN-causes throughout parts 1 and 2 of De
origine. The Type-1 B-entities, which in De origine I had their causal origin in
nature, namely in the form or in an IN-cause alone (cf. Fig. 8), are now attributed to
a mental act and seen as first intentions. This strategy is somehow more complex in
the inherents, or B-entities of Type 2.1; they had been directly attributed to OUTIN-
causes in De origine I, but in this second part he firstly attributes to them a natural
causation to then, by reducing them to some of the relations, to wit, those B-entities
of Type 3.1, to change this to a mental causation. The main role in this complex
foundational partitioning belongs to the relations, or Type-3 B-entities, which find a
central place in this ontology (see Fig. 18); this centrality captures the fact that all
there is for Dietrich of Freiberg are substances and relations in, or among, substances,
where these relations are mind-, rather than nature-made.
By comparing Figures 8 and 18, it can be easily seen that Dietrich’s foundational
ontology has undergone a major simplification from parts 1 through 2 of De origine.
Interestingly, this simplification is mostly structural, as its contents are essentially the
same.120 I show the further developments in Dietrich’s ontological investigations in
my forthcoming analyses of De origine III through V.
Acknowledgments
My translation of De origine rerum praedicamentalium from the Latin into English
was thoroughly reviewed by Kurt Flasch and Burkhard Mojsisch a few years ago. The
many changes made after their review, namely those aiming at increased readability,
might have introduced mistakes and inaccuracies.
References
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